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Introduction
Somalia, Liberia, Afghanistan, Zaire, and perhaps the latest casualty, Haiti,
indicate a disturbing trend in international society: the danger of disinte-
grating nation-States. 1 Civil war and/or overwhelming economic and
social dysfunction have led to governments that cannot perform or deliver
essential services. The ensuing human misery has generated appeals for
international intervention. 2 Thus, the U.N. Security Council is shoulder-
ing comprehensive projects in Somalia, Cambodia, and elsewhere;3 the
Secretary-General is promoting U.N. post-conflict peacebuilding; 4 scholars
and commentators are proposing paradigms to "save failed States,"5 to
assist disintegrating States, or simply to bring back colonialism; 6 and
1. See generally Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, FOREIGN
POL'Y, Winter 1992-93, at 3; Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Feb. 1994, at 44; Jon H. Sylvester, Sub-Saharan Africa: Economic Stagnation, Political Disin-
tegration, and the Specter of Recolonization, 27 Loy. LA L. REv. 1299 (1994);John Darnton,
Zaire Drifting into Anarchy as Authority Disintegrates, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1994, at Al.
2. Often television images prompt calls for action, while other situations are
ignored because they lack media attention. Helmut Freudenschub, Article 39 of the U.N.
Charter Revisited: Threats to the Peace and Recent Practice of the U.N. Security Council 46 Aus.
J. PUB. & INT'L L. 1, 22 (1993). In an effort to thwart international attention, the press
may be controlled or barred in a particular situation. See, e.g., Donatella Lorch, Drought
and Fighting Imperil 2 Million in Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1994, at AS (noting that the
press has been restricted in covering the war in Sudan). Because American and other
Western corporations dominate the media, what wars and conflicts are covered, and in
what manner, is decided largely from a Western perspective. Consequently, public
opinion, as a factor in deciding which situations are worthy of attention, skews the pro-
cess towards crises that Western public opinion believes merit attention. Unequal atten-
tion to equally grievous situations may raise consistency problems. See Stanley
Hoffmann, Out of the Cold: Humanitarian Intervention in the 1990s, HtRv. INT'L REv., Fall
1993, at 8, 9. As for sub-Saharan Africa, the end of the Cold War has meant that the
major powers have largely withdrawn, resulting in almost total marginalization. With
the removal of external strategic and ideological considerations, Africa's problems now
exist in regional and national, but not international, contexts. Francis Deng notes that
the "[c]auses and effects of conflicts are increasingly recognized as primarily internal."
Francis M. Deng, Africa and the New World Dis-order: Rethinking Colonial Borders, BROOK-
INGS Rv., Spring 1993, at 32. These situations may be ignored unless principal Western
powers perceive that significant national interests are at stake. This mode of decision-
making also raises consistency problems. While the current trend is more or less to
ignore these situations, State disintegration continues. At the same time, U.N. and for-
eign aid bureaucracies will continue to operate, thus insuring some effort to ameliorate
these situations, however piecemeal and ineffective these endeavors may be under such
adverse conditions. Sylvester, supra note 1, at 1323 & n.91. Consequently, it is impor-
tant that the theoretical and legal parameters of possible solutions be explored, and
this article is an effort to do so.
3. Report of the Secretary-Ceneral on the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 50-54, U.N. Doc. A/48/1 (1993) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-
General 1993]. These projects could be termed peacekeeping, peace-enforcement,
peacebuilding, or some combination thereof. See BouRos BOUTROS-GA aI, AN AGENDA
FOR PEACE: PREVENTrIVE DIPLOMACY, PEACEMAKING AND PEACE-KEEPING (1992) [hereinaf-
ter AN AGENDA FOR PEACE] (in which the Secretary-General explains his views on the
content of these terms).
4. AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 3, at 32.
5. Helman & Ramer, supra note 1, at 3.
6. Paul Johnson, Colonialism's Back - And Not a Moment Too Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
18, 1993, at F22; Charles Krauthammer, Trusteeship for Somalia; An Old-Colonial-Idea
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others critically appraise humanitarian intervention. 7 The United
Nations, or more specifically the efficient and apparently ever more pow-
erful Security Council, is usually suggested as the instrument for action.8
This article will focus on difficulties raised under the U.N. Charter,9
and international law generally, by proposals to bring back various forms
of trusteeship.10 Given some of the legal characteristics of trusteeship, it
may prove difficult to conceptualize a modem trusteeship system that
would address State disintegration. While concepts such as sovereignty,
self-determination, and humanitarian intervention are currently in transi-
tion,1 1 they still appear to preclude trusteeship, at least as it was originally
Whose TimeHas ComeAgain, WASH. PosT, Oct. 9, 1992, atA27; Claudio G. Segre, Colonial-
ism May Be Worth Bringing Back, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 3, 1993, at A7.
7. Bartram S. Brown, The Protection of Human Rights in Disintegrating States: A New
Challenge, 68 CH.-KErr L. REv. 203 (1992). A humanitarian crisis can be "structural,"
that is, "provoked... by the disintegration of a [S] tate." Hoffinann, supra note 2, at 9.
In his critique of humanitarian intervention, Professor Roberts notes that its definition
includes intervention if there is widespread starvation or the complete failure to ensure
the most elementary conditions of life. Adam Roberts, The Road to Hell. . A Critique of
Humanitarian Intervention, HARV. INT'L REV., Fall 1993, at 10.
8. The importance of the Security Council has grown since the end of the Cold
War, while that of the General Assembly has declined. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, North-
South Relations and the United Nations, in THE STATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1993:
NORTH-SOUTH PERSPECTIVES 1, 8 (Academic Council on the United Nations System
Reports and Papers No. 5, 1993). The Security Council has primary responsibility for
maintaining international peace and security. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1. "The
Security Council is also defining security more broadly and thus becoming involved in a
wider range of issues, including the protection of human rights, the delivery of humani-
tarian assistance, and the war against narcotrafficking." Riddell-Dixon, supra, at 8.
Many U.S. commentators favor the Security Council as an appropriate forum because
of current U.S. dominance in that organ. Focusing on a particular organ (such as the
Security Council versus the General Assembly) because of the influence that can be
exerted in that particular forum is not new. See Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention
in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 519 (1994).
9. While suggested functions for the United Nations vary considerably, all theorists
support some role for the Organization, even if it is limited to giving territories to trust-
ees. Johnson, supra note 6, at 22. Furthermore, this writer agrees with James Anderson
that the United Nations is the only global forum where States cooperate on a vast array
of international issues. It is a broadly representative arena, with an all time high of 185
members, and it is the logical starting point for any efforts to address trusteeship
problems. See James Anderson, New World Order and State Sovereignty: Implications for
U.N.-Sponsored Intervention, FLETCHER F., Summer 1992, at 127. However, the Organiza-
tion and its organs are limited and empowered by the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations, which may limit certain actions or prescribe criteria for their exercise.
See Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4
of the Charter), ICJ Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.CJ. 57, 64 (May 28). Consequently, there
may be legal obstacles to taking over a country, even if the goal is to make it over in a
better image.
10. A forthcoming article by the author will examine Secretary-General Boutros-
Ghali's proposals for postconflict nationbuilding and the U.N. efforts in this sphere in
Cambodia, Somalia, and elsewhere. Many thought that concepts such as colonialism
and trusteeship had only historical significance. See generally Neta C. Crawford,
Decolonization as an International Norm: The Evolution of Practices, Argument, and Beliefs, in
EMERGING NoRMs OF JUsTIFIED INTERVENTION 37 (Laura W. Reed & Carl Kaysen eds.,
1993) (explaining the evolution of decolonization as a norm).
11. Much of the post-World War I legal order revolved around the Cold War para-
digm. A subcontext, which was also influenced by the Cold War, was decolonization
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conceived. Thus, this article contends that while it may be possible to
reconceptualize trusteeship to address this problem,' 2 employing the trus-
teeship approach would entail surmounting considerable legal hurdles.
Part I of this article sets forth in general the problem of disintegrating
States. Defining when a State has disintegrated will be difficult, and it
raises the problems of who should make this decision and how to control
what could be a very political and subjective determination. While it may
be futile to try to provide definitive answers given the myriad scenarios,
various prospects will be considered, beginning with the viewpoints of
commentators that have addressed the problem. The necessity of distin-
guishing between civil war situations and a slow, but continuous, break-
down in operative governance will also be considered.' 3 Part I will also
describe various proposals to reinstate trusteeship and recolonization,
along with their underlying theoretical and legal bases.
Parts II and III will turn to two fundamental concepts that pose signif-
icant obstacles to imposing trusteeship on States: sovereignty and self-
determination. Sovereignty, the subject of part II, is a key concept both in
imposing trusteeship and in determining the status of trust territories.
Under the U.N. Charter, the trusteeship system is inapplicable to Member
and the emergence of countries that were generally capital poor, often natural resource
rich, and populated mostly by black, brown, and Asian people. See Thomas Franck,
Postmodem Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 3 (Catherine Br6lmann et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter Postmodern Tribalism]
(noting that the period of 1945-1990 was characterized by two major historical tenden-
cies, the Cold War and Third World decolonization). The conclusion of the Cold War
and the demise of the Soviet Union have necessitated considerable reassessment within
the international legal establishment. For example, the principle of self-determination
developed primarily within the context of decolonization. Id. at 10; Deborah Z. Cass,
Re-Thinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current International Law Theories, 18
SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & COM. 21, 25 (1992). In the post-Cold War era, however, many
new claims that do not involve decolonization are being asserted. See, e.g., MORTON H.
HALPERIN & DAVIDJ. SCHEFFER, SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 123-60
(1992); S.James Anaya, A Contemporary Definition of the International Norm of Self-Determi-
nation, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 132 (1993); Cass, supra, at 26-29;
Postmodem Tribalism, supra, at 11. Similarly, the legal discourse on military intervention
in civil wars revolved primarily around unilateral intervention and counter-intervention,
concepts that explained, justified, or vilified Soviet and U.S. interventions, as they
fought their ideological battle on Third World soil. Presently, there are new appraisals
of intervention and sovereignty because of the willingness of the United Nations to
intervene in the post-Cold War era and the present unwillingness of the remaining
military superpower to intervene unilaterally. See generally Thomas M. Franck, United
Nations Based Prospects for a New Global Order, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 601 (1990)
(rethinking the international system in the wake of the ending of the Cold War and the
central role of the U.N. in a new global order); W. Michael Reisman, International Law
After the Cold War, 84 AM.J. INT'L L. 859 (1990) (suggesting the need to re-think interna-
tional law in the post-Cold War era).
12. A work by the author in progress will use critical race theory to critique whether
we should bother to reconceptualize this paradigm to address State disintegration, even
if the legal barriers could be surmounted. The theoretical, political, and racial founda-
tions underlying the concept of trusteeship may render this entire approach
questionable.
13. The two situations may pose different legal problems, given the Security Coun-
cil's power to deal with threats to the peace. See U.N. CHARTER chs. VI, VII.
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States because of the principle of sovereign equality. 14 Given the chang-
ing nature of sovereignty, however, it is worth exploring whether it has
eroded to the extent that it is now compatible with a modem form of
trusteeship.
Self-determination, the subject of part III, is also a principle in the
midst of redefinition. 15 The concept developed largely within the context
of decolonization and, to some extent, the trusteeship and mandate sys-
tems were viewed as vehicles to achieve self-determination. 16 For our pur-
poses, there are several issues. Does international control of a territory
usurp the right of self-determination, making trusteeship impermissible,
or can it be a vehicle to implement that right? If it is a vehicle to imple-
ment self-determination, what are the goals and how are they to be
achieved?
Parts IV and V are efforts to reconceptualize trusteeship in the mod-
em era. Part IV explores how a State might assume trusteeship status, and
part V examines what trusteeship status would entail within the modem
international legal system. Part V discusses four possible scenarios. The
first is a voluntary assumption of trusteeship by a State for some fixed
period of time. It then turns to three involuntary methods: intervention
when State disintegration is a threat to the peace,' 7 intervention when the
threat to the peace merits humanitarian intervention,' 8 and intervention
14. U.N. CHARTER art. 78. Moreover, given the legal status of trust territories, sover-
eignty would seem to circumscribe its applicability to States.
15. See, e.g., HALPERIN & SCHEFFER, supra note 11, at 46-47; Christian Tomuschat,
Self-Determination in a Post-Colonial World, in MODERN LAw OF SELF-DETERMINATION 1, 2-8
(Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993); Anaya, supra note 11; Lea Brilmayer, Essay, Secession
and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT'L L 177 (1991); Cass,
supra note 11, at 21; Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination and World Public Order, 66 NOTRE
DAME L. Rxv. 1287 (1991); James AR. Nafziger, Sef-Determination and Humanitarian
Intervention in a Community of Power, 20 DEN.J. INT'L L. & Pot'y 9 (1991).
16. Antony Anghie, "The Heart of My Home:" Colonialism, Environmental Damage, and
the Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT'L LJ. 445, 466 (1993).
17. This section will explore State disintegration as a threat to the peace in the
sense that it may cause regional dislocations. The Security Council appears to be broad-
ening the concept of threat to the peace from civil wars and internal conflicts, perhaps
meaning that it does not need to have a catastrophic impact on neighboring countries.
Gordon, supra note 8, at 533-37.
18. The permissibility of humanitarian intervention is undergoing a transition and
is being actively debated by legal scholars. See, e.g., Ved. P. Nanda, Tragedies in Northern
Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti-Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention
Under International Law--Part I, 20 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305 (1992). Its legality is
generally being conceded when it is multilateral, as opposed to unilateral, intervention.
See, e.g., Nancy D. Arnison, International Law and Non-Intervention: When Do Humanita-
rian Concerns Supersede Sovereignty ., FLETCHER F., Summer 1993, at 201. The obstacle is
the principle of nonintervention, which is a corollary to sovereignty. Nonintervention
generally means that no State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, in the external or internal affairs of another State; every sovereign has the
right to conduct its affairs without external interference. Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 4, 106 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua v. United
States]. The primary questions are determining the particular human rights that may be
at risk when a State disintegrates and whether it is permissible for the Organization to
ignore sovereignty or other claims and intervene in such an overwhelming manner to
vindicate these rights.
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in cases where States have disintegrated to the point that they can be con-
sidered non-self-governing territories of a sort and thus eligible for trust
status.'
9
Finally, in part V, the legal status of a modern trust is explored. Given
the legal status of trust territories under the U.N. Charter, we must deter-
mine whether a trust entity can be both a State and a trust territory at the
same time. Making this determination entails trying to decide where sov-
ereignty would lie in these circumstances. The legal attributes of States
versus those of trust territories in the international system make this a diffi-
cult problem.
I. Disintegrating States: The Theory
A. The Concept of State Disintegration
Various commentators have described failed nation-States,20 coming anar-
chy,2 1 statehood existing in legal terms only,22 and the widespread deteri-
oration of conditions in specific countries and regions. 23 The common
theme is overwhelmed governments that are almost, if not completely,
unable to discharge basic governmental functions. Somalia is probably
the current textbook example, 24 but this scenario is attributable to a con-
19. The discussion will explore what we mean by failed in the context of which
states are eligible for trust status. The word "fail" is defined as, "to prove deficient or
lacking, perform ineffectively or inadequately, or to be unsuccessful in attempting to do
or become something." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE (William Morris ed., 1981). The question is whether "failed" States that are
potentially eligible for trust status are those that are merely inadequate or those that are
defunct. This is an important question because sovereignty is an incident of statehood.
LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (4th ed. 1990). Presumably
it is at least open to question as to whether trusteeship status could be imposed on a
defunct non-State.
20, Helman & Ramer, supra note 1, at 3.
21. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 44.
22. Robert H. Jackson, Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa, 46 J. INT'L Arr. 1
(1992).
23. Sylvester, supra note 1, at 1299.
24. When Mohamed Siad Barre fled inJanuary 1991, various clan militias turned on
each other, and the country was eventually divided into twelve zones of control. Since
that time there has been no functioning central government in Somalia. Jeffrey Clark,
Debacle in Somalia, FORIGN Arr., Winter 1992-93, at 109, 112. Efforts at political recon-
ciliation have been difficult. Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of
Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794, U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess. at 3-5, U.N. Doc. S/25354
(1994) [hereinafter Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 794].
There are no longer national or regional institutions for civil administration. Schools
are nonexistent, and there is a large refugee and displaced person population. Priority
sectors identified by U.N. agencies include: health, water, food, security, nutrition, san-
itation, employment, administrative rehabilitation, police forces, agriculture, and live-
stock. Id. at 6-8. These matters would appear to be the essence of governmental
responsibilities towards its citizenry. In his latest report on the work of the Organiza-
tion, the Secretary-General noted that Somalia is still without a central government.
BOUTROs BotrrRos-GHAU, BUILDING PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT, at 238, U.N. Doc. A/49/
1, U.N. Sales No. E.95.I.3 (1994).
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siderable number of other States.2 5
Professor Sylvester describes conditions in East and West Africa where
poverty is widespread, dependence on foreign aid is high, and national
economies are stalled.26 He concludes that most sub-Saharan economies
are not affording their populations even the most rudimentary standards
of living in such fundamental areas as nutrition, housing, medical care,
and education.2 7 Sylvester posits that when an economy so completely
deteriorates, government failure cannot be far behind, and thus, the polit-
ical structures upon which such economies depend will also fail. Worse,
he observes a general lack of public confidence that any of these problems
can be effectively addressed.
28
Journalist Robert Kaplan paints an even more dire picture. In parts
of West Africa, he depicts rampant demographic, environmental, and soci-
etal stress.29 He writes:
Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee
migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international bor-
ders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and interna-
tional drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West
African prism.30
Thus, Kaplan sees the breakdown of the nation-State in the government's
failure to provide such elementary services as the policing and controlling
of its territory.3 '
Governmental incapacity can also be a consequence of civil strife that
disrupts essential governmental services, destroys food supplies and distri-
bution networks, and brings the economy to a standstill.3 2 Rampant civil
strife seems to be an emerging attribute of the post-Cold War world order,
emanating from ethnic nationalism and accompanying desires to
secede,33 insurgencies against weak and/or corrupt governments,3 4 and
25. Liberia, Afghanistan, Angola, Sudan, Bosnia, and Zaire have all been suggested
as casualties. See, Helman & Ratner, supra note 1; Kaplan, supra note 1; Sylvester, supra
note 1; Damton, supra note 1; Tim Weiner, Blowback From the Afghan Battlefield, N.Y.
TimEs, Mar. 13, 1994, at F53.
26. Sylvester, supra note 1, at 1299. Professor Sylvester travelled through parts of
East and West Africa while he was a Fulbright Teaching Scholar.
27. Id. at 1306.
28. Id.
29. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 46. He believes this increasing lawlessness is more sig-
nificant than any coup, rebel incursion, or episodic experiment in democracy.
30. Id. at 46. He believes this scenario may portend what is in store for much of the
developing world.
31. Id. at 47.
32. Helman & Ratner, supra note 1, at 4-5. Powerful insurgencies have ensued and
escalated in a number of States, leading to the described devastation. This has been
compounded by natural disasters in Somalia and Sudan. Id. at 5.
33. Asbjorn Eide, In Search of Constructive Alternatives to Secession, in MODERN LAv OF
SELF-DETERMINATImN, supra note 15, at 139. Nationalist ideology often asserts:
Nations are to be defined in ethnic terms, referring to a common past history,
tradition, preferably also common language; secondly, nations should have
their own States, so the society composing a State should, as far as possible, be
Comnell International Law Journal
leftover effects from the Cold War.3 5
Helman and Ratner, and ProfessorJackson, also believe that the roots
of these debacles can be found in what they view as the rush towards
decolonization and the resulting proliferation of weak nation-States in
Africa and Asia. Helman and Ratner maintain that not enough attention
was paid to the long-term survivability of these new States.3 6 Rather, the
decolonization process suspended "the historical practice of extending
recognition and membership in the international community only to cred-
ible governments of more or less cohesive states."3 7 Instead, former colo-
nies were recognized as States "whether or not they had developed the
empirical characteristics of modern statehood,138 and today many of these
congruent with the nation, [sic] thirdly, the loyalty of members of nations to
that nation overrides all other loyalties.
Id. at 143 (citations omitted). This ethno-nationalism "can be expansionist, exclusivist,
and/or secessionist. In all of these modes it generates conflicts, sometimes with grave
consequences for peace and for human rights." Id. at 144. Expansionist ethno-nation-
alism can pose "severe threats to the territorial integrity of other States." Id. An exam-
ple might be Serbian expansion into Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina. "Ethno-
nationalism is inherently exclusivist [and, a] t its worst, it blends racism and xenophobia
causing extreme human rights violations." Id. "[It] excludes, segregates and sometimes
exploits on a basis of hierarchy." Id "Ethno-nationalist minorities sometime engage in
armed secession, whether in connivance with the 'mother country' or completely on
their own." Id. An example would be the Armenian population, of the AzerbaUan
enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is involved in armed secessionist efforts against
Azerbalan with assistance from Armenia. See Boutros-Ghali, supra note 24. Another
example is the Abkhazian population, in the Georgian enclave of Abkhazia, engaged in
armed secession against Georgia with armed support from volunteers from the north-
ern Caucasus region. Id.; Report of the Secretay-Genera4 supra note 3, at 42-43. Claims to
secede can also emanate from violations of minority rights. International law, however,
has not generally accepted such claims to secede. HALPERIN & SCHEFFER, supra note 11,
at 54-60.
34. Particularly long and brutal insurgencies against already weak governments with
tenuous economies can totally destroy the ability to govern.
35. The Soviet Union and the United States often carried out their global struggle
for ideological supremacy through proxy wars and by gaining the support of ideologi-
cally sympathetic governments. The superpowers sometimes attempted to change the
social and political structure of a country in order to install a government aligned to
their particular ideology. Once in place, the government received economic and mili-
tary aid to counter any opposition and to strengthen the government. In some cases,
superpower intervention was actually requested by a government to uphold law and
order and to suppress opposing forces. Thomas Fleiner-Gerster & Michael A. Meyer,
New Developments in Humanitarian Law: A Challenge to the Concept of Sovereignty, 34 INr't. &
COMp. L.Q. 267, 268 (1985). In sub-Saharan Africa, successive U.S. administrations cast
their lot with many of Africa's most corrupt regimes, including Zaire's President
Mobutu, Kenya's Daniel arap Moi, the repressive regime of Somalia's Mohamed Siad
Barre (who at one point also received Soviet support), and Liberia's Samuel K. Doe.
Michael Chege, Remembering Africa, 71 FOREIoN Arr. 146, 159 (1992). The continuation
of several current civil wars, on an appalling scale, can in part be attributed to the
massive supply of armaments by one or both superpowers during the Cold War. Promi-
nent examples include Afghanistan and Somalia. Gordon, supra note 8; Weiner, supra
note 25.
36. Helman & Ramer, supra note 1, at 4.
37. Jackson, supra note 22, at 2.
38. Id. Jackson explains that empirical statehood would encompass "an independ-
ent political organization of sufficient authority and power to govern a defined territory
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governments are barely functioning.3 9
Similar concerns exist regarding the survivability of the twenty or so
nascent States that emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the
USSR. Some of these States have little "practice in self-government ....
weak civic institutions, limited economic prospects," and are beset by eth-
nic strife.
4 0
Of course not all States experiencing difficulties are disintegrating.
Helman and Ratner identify three groups of struggling States:
First, there are failed States like Bosnia, Cambodia, Liberia, and Somalia, a
small group whose governmental structures have been overwhelmed by cir-
cumstances. Second, there are failing States like Ethiopia, Georgia, and
Zaire, where collapse is not imminent but could occur within several years.
And third, there are some newly independent states in the territories for-
merly known as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, whose viability is difficult
to assess.
4 1
The authors propose different solutions for each of the above categories,
and they recommend trusteeship for the first group.42
B. Addressing Severe Cases of Governmental Distress
The possibility of using some form of recolonization to deal with govern-
mental crises has been raised by several writers. Helman and Ratner advo-
cate conservatorship as the conceptual paradigm for U.N. assistance, and
they propose three models: governance assistance;4 3 the delegation of
and population." Id. at 1. "Other incidents might include a national identity, political
capability, military power, national wealth, bureaucratic efficiency, an educated citi-
zenry or historical precedent." Id. at 5.
39. Id. at 7.
40. Helman & Ramer, supra note 1, at 5. The backdrop to this scenario is the end
of the Cold War. The dissolution of the Soviet empire not only led to the establishment
of a large number of weak States, but it also unlocked the communist grip on Eastern
Europe, leaving in its wake States exhibiting widely divergent degrees of stability, eco-
nomic viability, and experience as nation-States. While the Cold War balance of power
paradigm caused much suffering in the form of covert wars, proxy wars, and other
ideological battles, it also imposed a modicum of certainty and its own form of stability.
Current uncertainty in the international realm may exacerbate internal instability.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 6.
43. This model assumes that there is still a regime in place that is effective to the
degree that it maintains some control over the instruments of the State. Id. at 13.
Examples "include Georgia, Zaire and possibly a handful of other States in Africa and
Asia." Id. It builds on existing technical assistance, but it would be far more expansive.
Id. "U.N. personnel would help administer the State, although final decision-making
authority would remain with the government." Id. The United Nations might require
economic changes; modify political structures and processes where they impact the
health of the State; and foster democratic institutions by drafting constitutions, organiz-
ing free elections, and strengthening civic institutions such as political parties andjudi-
cial systems. Id at 13-14. A variation on this theme is offered by Jeffrey Herbst. He
notes that the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and bilateral donors play an
important role in economic decisions, and therefore, they should condition aid on
political changes and other reforms. He posits that micromanagement will continue
and expand. Jeffrey Herbst, Challenges to Africa's Boundaries in the New World Order, 46J.
INT'L ArF. 17, 23 (1992).
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governmental authority to the United Nations;44 and direct U.N. trustee-
ship when there is a total breakdown of governmental authority.
The last model would resurrect the old trusteeship system and apply it
to failed States. 45 States would voluntarily relinquish control over their
internal and external affairs for a defined period.4 6 Local authorities
would relinquish their power to the United Nations and follow its orders.
The United Nations, or a group of States, would act as the administering
authority. Helman and Ratner propose that the United Nations and the
target State negotiate a trusteeship agreement containing the essential ele-
ments of the trust arrangement. 47 They suggest that the Security Council
is the most efficient organ available for this process. However, given its
limited experience with economic and social matters, a subgroup could be
established to oversee each conservatorship; and management facilities
could be developed in the U.N. Secretariat. 48
Paul Johnson, a historian, 49 believes that colonialism had some value
and argues that the mistake of eradicating it too quickly has caused the
current breakdown of normal government in a score or more African
States.5 0 He believes that the Security Council should commit such terri-
tories to one or more State trustees who would be empowered to impose
order by force and assume political functions. The trustees would possess
sovereign powers. The mandate would be of limited duration but should
last until there is effective self-government (which could conceivably take
up to one hundred years or more) .51 Ultimately, however, the trust would
be subject to Security Council supervision.52
Johnson concludes that we must abandon the conventional wisdom
that all peoples are ready for independence because some States are sim-
44. Here, governmental authority is actually delegated to the U.N. Cambodia is an
example where warring factions delegated governmental power while still retaining
final decision-making authority. Helman & Ramer, supra note 1, at 14.
45. The authors admit that this solution is currently precluded under the U.N.
Charter. See infra part HA.
46. Helman and Ramer conclude that States should not be the "unwilling object" of
the trusteeship system. Helman & Ramer, supra note 1, at 16.
47. Id. at 16-17.
48. Id. at 18-19.
49. Johnson does not address the legal problems his proposals would entail.
Rather, he focuses on reversing conventional political wisdom. Johnson, supra note 6.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 44. Johnson maintains that the "ultimate object would be to take constitu-
tional measures to insure a return to effective self-government... [;] we must not
repeat the mistakes of the 1960's. [Therefore,] trustees should not plan to withdraw
until they are reasonably certain that the return to independence will be successful
... ." I'd.
52. Id. Professor Sylvester criticizes this proposal as "a return to colonialism of the
thoroughly discredited sort." He notes that "economic exploitation inheres in bilateral
relationships where there is fixed hierarchy." Moreover, the notion "that the 'mother-
country' will embrace and champion the colony's interests is simply inconsistent with
human history since the rise of the nation-State." Sylvester, supra note 1, at 1314 n.49.
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ply not fit to govern themselves.53 He believes a moral imperative exists:
"the civilized world has a mission to go to these desperate places and
govern." 54
H. Trusteeship and the Principle of Sovereignty
A. Applying Trusteeship to Member States Under the Charter
Article 77 of the U.N. Charter precludes applying the trusteeship system to
Member States because they are sovereign States, and not territories under
mandate or some other form of dependency. 55 Article 78 explicitly states
that the trusteeship system does not apply to original or subsequent Mem-
bers of the United Nations because of the principle of sovereign equal-
ity.56 Therefore, unless we redefine sovereign equality, amend the
53. Johnson, supra note 6, at 44. "Their continued existence, and the violence and
degradation they breed, is a threat to the stability of their neighbors as well as an affront
to our consciences." Id.
54. Id. I agree with Professor Sylvester that the tone ofJohnson's article is offensive,
He uses such disparaging terms with respect to people of color and especially African
people that one wonders if the intent is "to shock readers into recognizing the magni-
tude of the crisis." Sylvester, supra note 1, at 1314. Yet, he apparently meant the article
to be a serious analysis of the situation, publishing it in the New York Times.
55. Article 77 provides:
1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following catego-
ries as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:
(a) territories now held under mandate;
(b) territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the
Second World War; and
(c) territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for
their administration.
U.N. CHARTER art. 77, para. 1. Today, only section (c) could apply with some legal
maneuvering. If not for Article 78, it is arguable that States could voluntarily place
themselves under trusteeship. See infra note 56. However, section (c) contemplated
that States administering colonies would place these territories under trusteeship.
RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 824-42 (1958). Since
Member States are not territories, application of section (c) is problematic.
56. Article 78 provides: "The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which
have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based
on respect for the principle of sovereign equality." U.N. CHARTER art. 78.
This article was included to ensure that the trusteeship system would not be applied
to some of the participants at the United Nations Conference whose status was ambigu-
ous. LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COM-
MENTARY AND DocUMETs 239 (1st ed. 1946). For example, the status of Syria and
Lebanon was not clear at the time of the conference in 1945. They were formerly
French mandated territories. In 1941, they were declared "independent" subject to the
conclusion of treaties redefining French rights. The treaties had not been concluded
by the time of the Conference, but nonetheless, they became original Members. Rus-
SELL, supra note 55, at 627; JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 337-38 (1979).
Because Article 78 applied to both original and subsequent Members, the Trustee-
ship Council would not consider petitions or communications from former trust territo-
ries. Morton Halperin and David Scheffer propose an interesting reading of Article 78.
They believe that the article eliminates from a modem trusteeship system the small
group of independent States that were previously U.N. trust territories. Presumably
other States, or parts thereof, could be potential candidates for the system. They admit
this is a narrow reading of Article 78 and they do not discuss Article 77. HALPERIN &
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Charter to extend the system to States, or determine that at some point a
State is neither a Member of the U.N. nor a State, the Charter will not
permit the imposition of trusteeship status on Member States.5 7
B. Defining Sovereignty
"State system values presuppose the organization of the international com-
munity into territorially separate, politically independent States."58 Given
this premise, the international legal system had to generate principles to
prevent interstate conflict and to promote friendly relations.59 One of
these principles is the sovereign equality of States. 60
Under the U.N. Charter, all Members enjoy the privileges of sover-
eign States.6 1 These privileges include sovereign equality62 and protection
from international interference in domestic affairs.63 Sovereign equality
means each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty. Sover-
SCHEFFER, supra note 11, at 113. However, Article 78 does not explicitly declare that it
applies only to former trust territories that have become Members of the United
Nations. The drafters apparently meant to preclude imposing trust status on any Mem-
ber of the United Nations. RUSSELL, supra note 55, at 825. Moreover, Russell notes that
Members are also described at other points in the Charter as "peace-loving [S]tates,"
and therefore, the reservation was technically unnecessary. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Helman and Ramer admit that the system is not applicable to States as it is
presently constituted, and they propose amending the Charter so that willing States can
choose trusteeship as an option. Helman & Ramer, supra note 1, at 6, 12-17.
58. Lori F. Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence
Over Political Affairs, 83 AM.J. INT'L L. 1, 35 (1989).
59. Id. at 35-36.
60. Id. at 36. Others include: prohibiting the use or threat of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State; the equal rights and self-
determination of peoples; and noninterference in the domestic jurisdiction of States.
Id.
61. Bengt Broms, States in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS
AND PROSPECTS 41, 60 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991).
62. Sovereign equality is a principle of the Organization. U.N. CHARR art. 2, para.
1. Sovereign equality has been interpreted to mean that: each State enjoys the rights
inherent in full sovereignty; all States enjoy equal rights and duties as well as juridical
equality; the territorial integrity and political independence of States are inviolable;
each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, economic, and cul-
tural systems; and each State has a duty to respect the personality of other States. Decla-
ration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th
Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly
Relations]. While General Assembly resolutions generally are nonbinding, some have
achieved the status of binding international law. Moreover, more formal declarations
often express the opiniojuris of the international community. This declaration has been
particularly influential and has been termed an authoritative interpretation of the U.N.
Charter. Adopted without a vote by the General Assembly after many years of negotia-
tion, many believe the declaration states existing international law. Hurst Hannum,
Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (1993).
63. U.N. CHARTrz art. 2, paras. 4, 7. The principle of sovereign equality and the
correlative duty of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other States are corner-
stones of international relations, as are the right to independence and the right to be
free from intervention. Dorinda Dallmeyer, National Perspectives on InternationalInteren-
tion: From the Outside Looking In, in BEYoND TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING 20 (Donald C.F.
Daniel & Bradd C. Hayes eds., 1995).
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eignty, however, is one of the most difficult and controversial concepts in
international law, and it is also a principle in transition. e"
A number of definitions and formulations are relevant. Sovereignty
includes exclusive jurisdiction over a territory and its permanent inhabit-
ants; accordingly, the State is the master of what transpires in its terri-
tory.6 5 Sovereignty also connotes independence and autonomy in
conducting both domestic affairs and foreign relations with other sover-
eign entities.6 6 Due to these notions of independence and exclusive juris-
diction, Article 78 of the U.N. Charter precludes applying the trusteeship
system to Member States. 67
C. Changing Notions of Sovereignty
While sovereignty has also been defined as the totality of powers States
hold under international law,6 8 this formulation is unsatisfactory because
the totality of powers possessed by States changes. 69 Indeed, sovereignty is
64. Ruth Lapidoth, Sovereignty in Transition, 45 J. INT'L AFF. 325 (1992). See, e.g.,
MARtrri KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEcAL ARGUMENT 205-12 (1989). Koskenniemi notes the difficulties in trying to define
sovereignty. Id. at 207. It is usually connected with independence, which is often
termed external sovereignty, and self-determination, which is viewed as internal sover-
eignty. Id. at 207.
65. BROWNuE, supra note 19, at 287-88. Another view of the concept is that sover-
eignty means the State is supreme and therefore is not subject to the demands of any
other authority. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 56, at 64.
66. "Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Indepen-
dence in regard to a portion of the globe, is the right to exercise therein, to the exclu-
sion of any other State, the functions of a State." Island of Palmas Case, II, UNITED
NATIONS, REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONAL AwARDs at 829, U.N. Sales No.
1949.V.1 (1928). James Anderson explains that sovereignty refers to a government's
exclusive right "to manage its internal affairs without external interference" and "to
conduct foreign affairs with other sovereign entities." Anderson, supra note 9, at 129.
Some commentators distinguish between internal and external aspects of sover-
eignty. Internal sovereignty effectively suggests internal self-government. It is the right
of each State to organize itself and exercise within its territory a monopoly of legitimate
physical coercion. Beyond internal self-government, internal sovereignty includes a
potential competence and readiness to absorb all State tasks and to determine autono-
mously the tasks, means, and priorities of the State. Sovereignty is plenary international
authority to administer territory. CRAWFoRD, supra note 56, at 27. External sovereignty
can be defined as independence-the power of a State to determine its responsibilities,
"means, and structures independently from any foreign State or organization, subject
only to international law." Luzius Wildhaber, Sovereignty and International Law, in THE
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 436-37 (R. St. J. Macdonald & Douglas
Johnston eds., 1983).
67. This preclusion is based on sovereign equality. See supra part IIA.
68. CRAWFORD, supra note 56, at 27. For example, Kamal Hossain views State sover-
eignty as "a distinctive characteristic of States as constituent units of the international
legal system," as "freedom of action in respect of all matters with regard to which a State
is not under any legal obligation," and as "the minimum amount of autonomy which a
State must possess before it can be accorded the status of a 'sovereign State'." Id. at 26
n.105 (quoting Kamal Hossain, State Sovereignty and the U.N. Charter (1964) (unpub-
lished Ms.D. Phil. dissertation, Oxford)).
69. Wildhaber, supra note 66, at 440-41. See also KOsKENNIEMI, supra note 64, at 211-
12. Lapidoth explains that while the concept of sovereignty has been employed since
ancient times, it has meant different things during different eras. During the Middle
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a relative notion that has varied over time and has adapted to new situa-
tions and exigencies; it continues to evolve.70
There is no doubt that the concept of sovereignty has been trans-
formed in many respects during the fifty year history of the United
Nations.71 There is also no doubt that the trend has been to lessen the
number of matters that are solely within the dominion of sovereign States.
Technology, 72 economic integration,73 and recognition of the indivisibil-
ity of the global ecosystem have altered perceptions of the State's ability to
ensure the well-being of its populace by unilateral action.74 As Professor
Hannum notes:
This reduced sovereignty results in part from the increasing interdepen-
dence of a world in which real political or economic independence is
impossible. It also results from conscious choices made by states to link
their fates through countless international agreements on trade, human
rights, culture, the environment, health, telecommunications, and other
matters.
75
Ages, it was used by territorial rulers tojustify' their aspirations to free themselves from
the influence of the emperor and the pope. In the 16th century, Jean Bodin was the
first writer to develop a comprehensive theory of sovereignty aimed at reinforcing the
French monarchy against feudal lords and rejecting claims of superiority from the pope
and emperor. Bodin maintained that sovereignty was the absolute and perpetual power
of a republic, meaning the totality of legislative power and the lack of higher earthly
authority. He conceded, however, that the sovereign was subject to the laws of God and
nature as well as to certain human laws. With Hobbes and his Leviathan, sovereignty
became absolute, that is, free of any limits. Other authors including Hegel further
developed this concept of unlimited sovereignty. The trend towards absolutism, how-
ever, discredited the concept of sovereignty with some 20th century authors. Lapidoth,
supra note 64, at 326. The concept of absolute sovereignty is no longer accepted today.
Id. at 327.
70. Wildhaber, supra note 66, at 441. For example, "the ultimate evidence of the
sovereignty of States in 'classical' international law was their right to resort to interven-
tion, aggression, war, annexation and colonization." Id. The U.N. Charter outlawed
the use of force, yet continued to accept States as sovereign. "Sovereignty became read-
ily imaginable without the right to wage war." Id. The different versions of sovereignty
expounded during various phases of the subjugation of non-European peoples demon-
strated the lack of any inherent logic to the doctrine of sovereignty. During the stages
of initial conquest, 19th Century imperialism, the League of Nations Mandate period,
and the United Nations era, varying views of sovereignty emerged, all of which sup-
ported the rights of European powers largely to the detriment of dependent peoples.
For a detailed and brilliant discussion of this utilization of sovereignty doctrine, see
Anghie, supra note 16. Competing versions of sovereignty also have been propounded
to interpret principles such as self-determination and permanent sovereignty over natu-
ral resources.
71. MANNARASWARNIGHAIA S. RAJAN, THE EXPANDING JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 195-200 (1982). Some of these changes have been due to actions undertaken
by the Organization and to provisions within the Charter.
72. See generally Walter B. Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty, 17 FLETCHER F. 117
(explaining how technology is weakening sovereignty).
73. Financial markets are interconnected; people, ideas, and lawbreakers move
across borders in great numbers; and free trade agreements and common markets
render ideas of a self-contained State economic system obsolete. Lapidoth, supra note
64, at 334.
74. Dallmeyer, supra note 63.
75. Hannum, supra note 62, at 68.
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States belong to an increasing number of international organizations
to which they sometimes transfer considerable powers.7 6 While States are
undoubtedly still the most important international entities, their relative
significance within the U.N. system has declined since the Organization's
founding in 1945. 77 Non-State actors such as multinational corporations,
nongovernmental organizations, and, at least during the age of
decolonization, national liberation movements78 have emerged to exert
influences on international governance in a fashion formerly attributed
only to nation-States. 79
Thus, today a multiplicity of international actors80 increasingly
assume responsibility for matters which formerly belonged within the sole
domain of sovereign States. Although the principle of sovereignty still
remains central, sovereign authority must now compete with other norms
for primacy in particular cases.8 '
Despite such erosion of sovereign authority, it is doubtful that the
concept of sovereignty has diminished to the point where it would permit
the imposition of trusteeship. However narrowly sovereignty is defined,
76. Lapidoth, supra note 64, at 334. On the relationship of States to international
organizations, see FREDERIC L KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL
SErrING 142 (2d ed. 1993).
77. Riddell-Dixon, supra note 8, at 3. Professor Riddell-Dixon believes that loyalty
to the State may decline as people realize that the State is "less able to engage in life-
enriching, community-enhancing activities." As a result, primary allegiances may shift
to associations that are based on considerations of race, ethnicity, or ideology. Id.
"Trade and finance, violence in all shapes and forms, human rights abuses, famine and
environmental degradation, drug trafficking, the spread of diseases such as AIDS, and
the quest for greater justice and social equality all transcend State boundaries and
require global approaches to meet the challenges they pose." Id.
78. For example, these movements have been accorded some legal capacity and
have been permitted to participate in the proceedings of the U.N. as observers. Ray-
mond Ranjeva, Peoples and National Liberation Movements, in INTERNATIONAL LA~W
ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 60, at 101, 108-09.
79. This is not to claim that these entities possess the full panoply of rights, duties,
and powers ascribed to nation-States. International legal personality does not connote
the possession of the same rights and obligations as States. Bin Cheng, Introduction to
Subjects of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAw,. ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS, Supra
note 61, at 23, 25; Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11) (finding that the United Nations is an international per-
son which exercises and enjoys functions and rights based on possessing a large mea-
sure of international personality, but that such legal personality, rights, and duties are
not the same as those of a State) [hereinafter Reparation for Injuries]. In fact, since
sovereignty legitimates the supremacy of the State within the United Nations, States
generally resist reform efforts that undermine sovereignty and thus their privileged
position. Riddell-Dixon, supra note 8, at 6.
80. Up until the Second World War, which can be described as the classical period
of international law, the State was the sole subject of international law for whose benefit
all rights and obligations were recognized. Ranjeva, supra note 78, at 102.
81. Riddell-Dixon, supra note 8, at 6. This is especially true in the human rights
field. See infra part IV.B. For example, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has proposed a
broad open-ended approach: "Underlying the rights of the individual and the rights of
peoples is a dimension of universal sovereignty that resides in all humanity and provides
all peoples with legitimate involvement in issues affecting the world as a whole." Rid-
dell-Dixon, supra note 8, at 6.
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trusteeship preempts the sovereignty of the State concerned because by
definition it means that the entity being controlled is incapable of self-
government, and that a foreign entity has plenary power over its internal
and external affairs. Control of internal and external affairs is the essence
of sovereignty, and surrendering all power over these matters to another
entity is a relinquishment of sovereignty.8 2
Trusteeship would also mean the State is no longer in control of
defining its own economic, social, or political structures, which is an essen-
tial aspect of sovereign equality.8 3 Rather, the United Nations would
make these decisions.8 4 Consequently, the principle of sovereign equality
would appear to preclude applying the trusteeship provisions to Member
States because trust status preempts sovereignty by usurping both external
independence and plenary power over internal affairs.
Finally, while all States jealously guard their sovereignty, the concept
is not equally significant to the North and South.8 5 Partly due to their
relative economic and political weakness, many Third World States have
experienced even greater inroads into the prerogatives of sovereignty.8 6
Weaker southern States are vulnerable to economic and military encroach-
ment by major powers, and thus they steadfastly defend such concepts as
State sovereignty and non-intervention.8 7 Since trusteeship is likely to
82. While it is true that a State can relinquish aspects of its sovereignty in the exer-
cise of its sovereignty, this is not the case when trusteeship is imposed. Rather, in this
situation the State is compelled to relinquish matters that are central to sovereignty.
Moreover, even if it is voluntary, it remains to be explored how much sovereign author-
ity can be given away before a State ceases to be a State. See infra part V.B.
83. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 62. Given the overwhelming influ-
ence of aid agencies, international banks and financial institutions, and other intergov-
ernmental and nongovernmental entities, these matters have a much more
international dimension. Nonetheless, these matters are still decisions that are impor-
tant aspects of sovereignty.
84. See HALPERIN & SCHEFFER, supra note 11, at 90-91 (on the adoption of free-mar-
ket oriented economic systems as a pre-requisite for recognition in self-determination
cases); Report of the Secretary-General 1993, supra note 3, at 1 (on the introduction of
democracy). This is not to say that these forms of economic and political organization
cannot be freely chosen, nor is it to judge the merits of these particular systems. The
question is whether these decisions should be made or imposed by external authorities.
These matters would seem to be at the heart of sovereignty and within the domain of
sovereign authority.
85. North and South are used here to connote the difference between the more
industrialized nations, which are primarily located in the northern hemisphere, and
developing nations, many of which are located in the southern hemisphere. It is
acknowledged that this division is not universally applicable, that North and South are
inexact terms, and that the States within these spheres differ markedly. The same
problems of terminology are acknowledged for the term "Third World" especially in
light of the collapse of the communist Second World.
86. Claims that sovereignty is diminishing are usually framed so that primarily
Third World States lose sovereign prerogatives. For example, more intrusive measures
by the World Bank, IMF, and other organizations have been encouraged and pro-
moted. Herbst, supra note 43, at 23; HALPERIN & SCHEFFER, supra note 11. These meas-
ures would only affect Third World States.
87. Riddell-Dixon, supra note 8, at 6. These nations are suspicious of a right to
intervention, which is often viewed as a subterfuge for domination by the major powers.
Northern industrialized States are often willing to support intervention in other parts of
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apply only to Third World States, these States are likely to resist vehe-
mently any suggestion that there has been such a decline in sovereignty
and that applying trusteeship to Member States is no longer precluded
under Article 78.
IMI. Trusteeship and Self-Determination
Professor Hurst Hannum opines that
no contemporary norm of international law has been so vigorously pro-
moted or widely accepted-at least in theory-as the right of all peoples to
self-determination. 88 Yet the meaning of that right remains as vague and
imprecise as when it was enunciated by President Woodrow Wilson and
others at Versailles.89
Self-determination has been, and remains, a difficult and controversial
principle in international law.90
A. Self-Determination and Decolonization
During and after World War I,91 self-determination in the form of political
independence for national groups was advanced for Europeans.92 For
the world, but they intensely resent any interference in their own internal affairs. Id.
Moreover, the economic and military might of the industrialized States, backed by four
vetoes on the Security Council, makes such intervention highly unlikely. Id.
88. Hannum, supra note 62, at 2.
89. Id.
90. For a recent discussion of the rule's incoherence, see THoMAs FRANcK, THE
POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 150-82 (1990).
91. The principle was previously regarded as the right of nations to sovereign inde-
pendence. For a detailed history, see UMOZUIKE 0. UMozuRKE, SELF-DETERMINATION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 3-26 (1972).
92. Not all European nationals to whom the principle potentially applied benefit-
ted. Historic rights, national security, and other matters sometimes took precedence.
FRAcK, supra note 90, at 154-59. See also Hannum, supra note 62, at 4-5 (noting the
uneven application of self-determination in the postwar environment). In introducing
the concept to the League of Nations in 1919, Woodrow Wilson described it as "the
right of every people to choose the sovereign under which they live, to be free of alien
masters, and not to be handed about from sovereign to sovereign as if they were prop-
erty." Cass, supra note 11, at 23-24. This view was advanced in the midst of the Euro-
pean turmoil of World War I. Anaya, supra note 11, at 147.
The peace treaties following World War I established a national system in Europe
which drew boundaries on the basis of nationality. However, each State still had minor-
ities, thereby necessitating minority rights regimes for those populations. Both models
were based on the fledgling principle of self-determination. SeeNaftiger, supranote 15.
Because of the oppression of minorities in some new States, some critics believed that
the 1919 Peace Conference achieved national determinism rather than self-determina-
tion. UMOzrUKE, supra note 91, at 23.
Self-determination was probably not the primary rationale behind the post-World
War I settlements. The dominant motives appear to have been rewarding faithful allies,
dealing severely with conquered foes, and establishing a new balance of power. Id. at
24. See, e.g., RAMtENDRA N. CHOWDHURI, INTERNATIONAL MANDATES AND TRUSTEESHIP SYS-
TEMS, A CoMPARATrIvE STUDy 45-46 (1955) (detailing the secret treaties negotiated by
Britain during the First World War promising various territories to its allies). Moreover,
this particular form of self-determination only applied to Europeans. Accordingly, non-
European national groups of the collapsed Ottoman Empire were not accorded similar
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non-Europeans, however, any semblance of self-determination was embod-
ied in the League of Nations Mandate system.93 Within this framework,
self-determination meant being entrusted to the tutelage of "advanced
nations" who were responsible for the well-being and development of their
charges94 and carried out this responsibility as a sacred trust of civiliza-
tion.95 Thus, the full exercise of self-determination was held in trust until
undeveloped peoples were sufficiently mature politically to bear the
responsibility.96 Self-determination within this framework involved
"independent existence" 97 or a form of political independence that these
peoples were deemed not ready to assume.
rights. Self-determination also did not extend to the Third World. For an extensive
history of self-determination, see UMOZURIKE, supra note 91; Hannum, supra note 62, at
1-31.
93. Self-determination was not actually articulated in the League of Nations Cove-
nant. Rather, Article 22 of the Covenant provides for a sacred trust of civilization
undertaken by advanced nations to develop peoples not able to stand by themselves in
the modem world. This goal has been interpreted as being the seed of self-determina-
tion for those populations placed under mandate. UMOZURIKE, supra note 91, at 34.
94. Non-European countries were considered nonconversant with Western ideas
and the institutions of modem government. Jackson, supra note 22, at 3. The eventual
aim of the mandate system was to lead territories to self-determination. Cass, supra note
11, at 25. Umozurike maintains that the mandate system demonstrates "international
recognition that the principle of self-determination applied to all peoples regardless of
their stage of development." UMOZURIKE, supra note 91, at 40.
95. The ICJ determined in its 1950 Advisory Opinion on the International Status of
South West Africa and its 1971 Advisory Opinion on Namibia that in setting up the
mandate system, "two principles [are] of paramount importance: the principle of non-
annexation and the principle that the well-being of such peoples form a sacred trust of
civilization." Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971
I.C.J. 16, 28 (June 21) [hereinafter Status of Namibia]; International Status of South-
West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128 (July 11) [hereinafter Status of South-West Africa]. The
trust had to be exercised for the benefit of the peoples concerned, who were admitted
to have interests of their own and to possess the potential for independent existence
upon the attainment of a certain stage of development. The mandate system was
designed to provide peoples "not yet" able to manage their own affairs with the help
and guidance necessary to enable them to stand by themselves.
Paragraph two of Article 22 considers the requisite means of assistance and indicates
that those Powers who undertake the task envisaged act exclusively as mandataries on
behalf of the League. "The mandate was created, in the interest of the inhabitants of
the territory, and of humanity in general, as an international institution with an interna-
tional object-a sacred trust of civilisation." Status of Namibia, supra; at 29. Acceptance
of a mandate connoted assumption of an obligation of both a moral and a binding legal
character. As a corollary of the trust, "securities for its performance were instituted in
the form of legal accountability for its discharge and fulfillment." Id. Thus, mandata-
ries had to report annually to the council, and a permanent mandates commission was
created. Id.
96. The mandate was a preparatory stage which was meant to be temporary.
UMozuaiKE, supra note 91, at 40. "Temporary," however, could perhaps mean a cen-
tury. The assumption was that the mandate system would end when the mandated terri-
tories were able to stand by themselves. The inhabitants were to participate
progressively in self-government until they achieved independence or freely chose some
other relation. Id. at 40-41.
97. Status of Namibia, supra note 95, at 29.
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Unlike the League of Nations Covenant, the U.N. Charter explicitly
incorporates the principle of self-determination. Self-determination is
among the purposes of the Organization 9s and is affirmed in U.N. Charter
articles on economic and social cooperation and human rights.99
Although not included in the articles on non-self-governing territories or
the trusteeship system, 100 both paradigms have been regarded as regimes
designed to achieve the goal of self-determination.'10 According to the
International Court of Justice, the U.N. Charter confirmed the principle
of sacred trust and extended it to all territories whose peoples had not yet
attained full self-government. 02
The ultimate objective of sacred trust was the self-determination and
independence of the peoples concerned.' 03 This principle made self-
determination applicable to all territories under colonial regimes. Thus,
tutelage became a means of executing self-determination. Trust territo-
ries were to be brought to the point where its inhabitants could freely
choose their political status, and presumably that choice would be
independence.
B. The Status, Scope, and Limits of Self-Determination
The International Court of Justice has found that self-determination is a
98. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 provides that one of the purposes of the United
Nations is "[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the prin-
ciple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace."
99. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
100. U.N. CHARTER arts. 73, 75-91.
101. Anghie, supra note 16, at 466. Professor Higgins maintains that the U.N. Char-
ter did not provide for self-determination in the form in which it has evolved. Rosalyn
Higgins, Commentary on Post Modern Tribalism, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNA-
TioNAL LA~W, supra note 11, at 29-30. The few references in the Charter to self-determi-
nation, in Articles 1(2) and 55, refer to friendly relations based on "equal rights and
self-determination." Id. at 29. According to Professor Higgins, in each context the U.N.
Charter sought to protect the rights of the peoples of one State from interference by
other States or governments. The U.N. Charter provided for the equal rights of States
or governments, rather than the equal rights of peoples. "The concept of self-determi-
nation, as envisaged by the drafters of the Charter, did not refer to the right of depen-
dent peoples to be independent, or indeed, even to vote." Id. There is no reference to
self-determination in the parts of the Charter that deal with dependent territories. The
provisions on trusteeship do not include self-determination, and independence was not
assumed to be the only proper outcome of the system. Thus, Professor Higgins con-
cludes that the idea developed "along paths significantly different from those originally
envisaged." Id. at 30. Cf RUSSELL, supra note 55, at 814-18. In early commentary on the
U.N. Charter, Goodrich and Hambro stated that self-determination had a two-fold
meaning: respect for the wishes of the people concerned in determining territorial
changes, and the right of peoples to choose the form of government under which they
were to live. They also noted that the delegations at the San Francisco Conference did
not mean, by using these words, to encourage the peoples of dependent territories to
demand their immediate independence. They believe this conclusion follows from
Article 2(7) on domestic jurisdiction and the chapters dealing with non-self-governing
peoples (Chapters XI, XII, and XIII). GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 56, at 61-62.
102. Status of Namibia, supra note 95, at 31.
103. Id.
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legal right specifically applicable to non-self-governing territories. 1 0 4
Moreover, some commentators maintain that the right to self-determina-
tion from colonial rule is a norm ofjus cogens in international law; its exist-
ence is undisputed, and within the colonial context, its applicability is
relatively irrefutable. 10 5  Extending self-determination beyond the
decolonization context is currently a subject of debate. 10 6 Yet the princi-
ple's status within this framework is clear and unambiguous: non-self-gov-
erning people are entitled to a right of self-determination.' 0 7 Thus, it is
firmly established that the right of self-determination exists in interna-
tional law, at least in this limited context. 10 8
While the principle, as enunciated in the U.N. Charter, may have
been meant to apply more narrowly,10 9 it has evolved to embrace the
"right" of all peoples" 0 freely to determine, without external interference,
104. The I.CJ. discussed the right to self-determination in two cases which arose out
of colonialism: The Advisory Opinion on the Status of Namibia, where the court
affirmed the applicability of self-determination to non-self-governing territories, and
the Western Sahara case, where the Court proclaimed the right of peoples to determine
their political status by their freely expressed will. The Court found that self-determina-
tion was more than a principle to be heeded and promoted by the United Nations, but
rather a full-fledged right that could be invoked by its holders to claim separate state-
hood and sovereign independence. Tomuschat, supra note 15, at 2; Status of Namibia,
supra note 95, at 31; Western Sahara, 1975 I.CJ. 6, 31-33 (Oct. 16). During the 1960s
and 1970s, self-determination became associated exclusively with the process of
decolonization. GerryJ. Simpson, Judging the East TimorDispute: Self-Determination at the
International Court ofJustie, 17 HASTriNGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 323, 335 (1994).
105. Simpson, supra note 104, at 336.
106. See, e.g., MODERN LAw Or SELF-DETERMINATMON, supra note 15; HALPERIN & SCHEF-
FER, supra note 11; Anaya, supra note 11; Brilmayer, supra note 15; Cass, supra note 11;
Chen, supra note 15; Hannum, supra note 62; Maivfn Clech tAm, Making Room for Peo-
ples at the United Nations: Thoughts Provoked by Indigenous Claims to Self-Determination, 25
CORNELL INT'L LJ. 603 (1992); Robert McCorquodale, Self-Determination Beyond the Colo-
nial Context and Its Potential Impact on Africa, 4 AFR. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 592 (1992).
107. Simpson, supra note 104, at 336.
108. Id. at 333-34. Professor Simpson points to a number of I.CJ. opinions affirming
the right, numerous U.N. declarations and human rights treaties doing the same, and
the weight of State practice during the period of decolonization, where a billion people
were liberated under the banner of self-determination. What remains at issue is the
scope or potential application of the principle, including its relationship with other
principles of international law with which it may come into conflict, as well as who is
entitled to claim the right. Id. at 334. See also Hannum, supra note 62 (exploring the
current meaning of the right of self-determination and its relationship to the process of
decolonization, to the possibility of secession, and to human rights).
109. Higgins, supra note 101.
110. Self-determination occupies a unique position in international law because it is
attributed to an entity that is not a legal person under international law. Otto Kim-
minich, A "Federal" Right of Self-Determination?, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION,
supra note 15, at 86. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Rights Covenants recognize community and solidarity values based on blood and his-
tory only with respect to self-determination. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA.
Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. Both International Rights Cove-
nants provide in Article I: "All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their eco-
nomic, social and cultural development."
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their political status and to pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development."' Politically, this right is manifested through the establish-
ment of a sovereign and independent State, free association or integration
with an independent State, or any other political status freely determined
by a people." 2 Thus, in the decolonization context, the absence of exter-
nal domination was key, involving claims of a group within an established
colonial entity to form a new entity-a sovereign State in most cases. Self-
determination has meant freedom from the direct foreign control of
other States."a3
The right of a particular group of people freely to determine their
own political, economic, cultural, and social systems seems to preclude
outside forces from making or coercing these decisions because self-deter-
mination requires the absence of external domination. Thus, if self-deter-
mination currently means independence and freedom from all forms of
foreign control, then trusteeship, which entails tutelage and dependence,
is unacceptable.
111. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 62. States also have a duty to respect
this right. Id. According to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colo-
nial Peoples, self-determination is the right of all peoples to determine their political
status and freely to pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res. 1514, U.N.
GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) [hereinafter Declara-
tion on Colonial Peoples]; UMozuiuKE, supra note 91, at 3.
The right to self-determination may be defined as the right of a people or
nation to determine freely by themselves without outside pressure their polit-
ical and legal status as a separate entity, preferably in the form of an independ-
ent state; the form of government of their choice; and the form of their
economic, social and cultural system.
Kimminich, supra note 110, at 85 (quoting Frank Przetacznik, TheBasic Collective Human
Right to Self-Determination of Peoples and Nations as a Prerequisite for Peace: Its Philosophical
Background and PracticalApplication, 69 REVUE DE DRorr ITr'L 263 (1991)). This defini-
tion is similar to the definitions in the 1966 Covenants. Id. See supra note 110.
112. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 62. In practice this has meant
independent statehood. Tomuschat, supra note 15, at 11-13.
113. Self-determination has been further defined as having both external and inter-
nal components. Externally, it is the freedom of an ethnic group or nation to organize
itself as a State without foreign control. Kimminich, supra note 110, at 88. Internally, it
is the freedom of a nation, organized as a State, to adopt political institutions and tech-
niques as it deems fit and to select forms of government as it pleases. Id. at 89. Both
prongs insure democratic government and the absence of internal or external domina-
tion. UMOZURIE, supra note 91, at 3. Professor Chen has divided claims for self-deter-
mination into two basic categories:
1. Claims involving establishment of a new entity-claims by a group within
an established entity to form a new entity from part of the pre-existing State.
2. Claims not involving establishment of a new entity:
a. Claims of an entity to be free of external coercion;
b. Claims of a people to overthrow their effective rulers and establish a
new government in the whole of an entity;,
c. Claims of a group within an entity to special protection (e.g.,
autonomy).
Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination as a Human Right in ToWARD WoRLD ORDER AND
HUMAN DiGNrry 198, 206-07 (W. Michael Reisman & Burns H. Weston eds., 1976).
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Moreover, it is difficult to go in reverse. It is one thing to conclude
that already dependent territories are incapable of self-government and
must be led to that point; it is quite another to reach the same conclusion
with respect to already self-governing peoples. This is especially true in
light of the history of self-determination, which has evolved to mean inde-
pendence. Thus, at the very least, if self-determination means indepen-
dence from colonial rule, including trust status, it precludes imposing
trusteeships. 14
Self-determination, however, also appears to include the right of a
people freely to determine their own political status.1 15 While peoples
have generally preferred independence when exercising that choice," 6 it
is feasible that they might choose a more or less benign form of outside
control.1 17 Thus, if self-determination is interpreted as paying heed to the
freely expressed will of peoples, 1 8 then mechanisms could be established
to enable a people freely to choose foreign supervision by an inter-govern-
mental organization.
Procedural safeguards designed to insure that this choice is indeed
the will of the people would be necessary. One potential model has been
proposed in the decolonization context where self-determination is exer-
cised by free association with a sovereign State: "[f]ree association with
another state requires a 'free and voluntary choice... through informed
and democratic processes,' and must include the right of unilateral modi-
fication of association by the peoples of the territory."119
114. The Declaration on Colonial Peoples called for immediate steps in both trust
and non-self-governing territories to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territo-
ries without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed
will and desire. Declaration on Colonial Peoples, supra note 111, para. 5. Thus, trusteeship
is treated as a form of colonialism and part of the classic colonial paradigm where a
people seek self-determination from a European imperial power. It is within this con-
text that self-determination is unconditional. Simpson, supra note 104, at 337.
115. Moreover, in various contexts commentators have advocated that self-determi-
nation does not necessarily mean independence. See, e.g., Anaya, supra note 11; Am,
supra note 106. These authors have proposed solutions for the problems of national
minorities within nation-States. They do not advocate the type of complete control
trusteeship would entail, however.
116. Sovereign statehood has not been the uniform choice. See Hannum, supra note
62, at 40 n.164 (describing the few territories that have attained a status of less than full
independence).
117. This possibility raises the question of who constitutes "the people" for these
purposes. The easy answer is the peoples of the State as a whole; however, there may be
opposing factions which may make this assessment difficult. For example, in Somalia
some factions desired U.N. intervention while others simultaneously demanded that the
Organization leave the country. Mark R. Hutchinson, Restoring Hope: U.N. Security
Council Resolutions for Somalia and an Expanded Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 34
HARv. INT'L LJ. 624, 629 n.27 (1993). Another interpretation is that once a nation or
ethnic group has attained statehood by exercising the right of self-determination, the
State thus created is the sole subject of international law until a situation arises in which
the right of peoples is revitalized. Kimminich, supra note 110, at 89.
118. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 62.
119. Hannum, supra note 62, at 40 (quoting Declaration on Colonial Peoples, supra note
111, annex, principle VII).
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Thus, foreign control should be exercised only in accordance with
the will of the people, which must be ascertained through democratic
processes.' 20 Plebiscites' 2 1 have been repeatedly utilized to ascertain pop-
ular opinion on a suitable political status upon the demise of trusteeship.
People exercised their right of self-determination through this device.122
It must be concluded that only through direct consent can trusteeship be
implemented in a manner that does not contravene the right to self-deter-
mination. Whether any group would freely make such a choice remains to
be seen. 123
IV. The Reversion to Dependency
In conceptualizing a modem trust, the first issue for consideration is how
a sovereign nation-State might revert to trusteeship. 124 Four possibilities
will be discussed. First, a State might voluntarily agree to trusteeship, pre-
sumably with the government entering into an agreement with the United
Nations. Second, the Security Council, finding State disintegration in a
particular case to be a threat to peace, might mandate the imposition of a
trusteeship. A third scenario would be humanitarian intervention in the
form of trusteeship, arising out of a critical humanitarian crisis or gross
violations of human rights that are precipitated by a breakdown in govern-
ance. 125 Finally, if certain States have disintegrated to the point where
they are no longer States, the Charter prohibition against applying the
120. This conclusion is in accord with Thomas Franck's thesis on an emerging right
to democratic governance. Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,
86 AM.J. INT'L L. 46 (1992). While Professor Franck addresses internal self-determina-
tion, his thesis might apply to outside control exercised by international organizations.
Thus, foreign control should be allowed only where the people select that option in
accordance with democratic processes. Moreover, a supermajority requirement could
be employed to ensure that a bare majority does not decide the fate of the entire
nation.
121. Plebiscite is a subset of the larger category of referendum. It is a type of refer-
endum wherein the proposal at issue concerns the matter of sovereignty. LAWRENCE T.
FARLEY, PLEBIscITEs AND SOVEREIGNTY. THE CIusis OF POLITIcAL ILLEGITimACY 26 (1986).
It is conceded that some situations may be so chaotic that is impossible to hold any kind
of plebescite. Perhaps in such a case, a vote should be held as soon as it is logistically
possible.
122. CHOWDDHIURI, supra note 92. It is a device with which the United Nations is famil-
iar. While plebiscites previously involved peoples exercising their right to be free from
external control and to govern themselves, here people would choose or reject foreign
control as a mechanism to achieve sovereign statehood. Moreover, this foreign control
would be exercised by an international organization, rather than by an individual State.
123. It is doubtful that there will be a rush towards trusteeship, because while many
people welcome assistance, most do not willingly choose dependency. Nevertheless, it
is conceivable that a particular situation could become so desperate that people would
desire U.N. control for a specified period of time.
124. The word "revert" is purposely used here because trust territories occupied a
lesser status than nation-States in the international community. See infra part VA
Thus, a State which assumes trusteeship status would be reverting to a diminished
position.
125. The Security Council's response to the situation in Somalia may suggest that
violations of international humanitarian law can trigger Article 39's threat to the peace
requirements for Chapter VII action. Hutchinson, supra note 117, at 632.
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trusteeship provisions to Member States may no longer apply.' 26 Each
prospect will be considered in turn.
A. Voluntary Assumption of Trusteeship
Presumably a State can voluntarily relinquish all control over its internal
and external affairs and cede this authority to the United Nations.' 27 The
sovereignty of a State empowers it to abdicate sovereignty and thus "com-
mit suicide" under international law. This happens, for example, when a
State enters a federation and loses its international personality.' 2 8 Per-
haps a disintegrating State could abdicate sovereignty for a temporary
period of time.' 2 9
Consent obviates domestic jurisdiction and non-intervention obsta-
cles,' 3 0 but it raises other difficult questions, such as who is authorized to
give consent to such an overwhelming intervention. It is unlikely that
many governments would voluntarily agree to completely follow the
orders of an outside force, however benevolent, without retaining some
veto authority, nor agree to be dependent to the extent trust territories
were.
131
In addition, if a government is so totally ineffective that trusteeship is
warranted, it is questionable whether it can consent to outside interven-
126. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 77, 78; supra part IIA
127. Helman and Rarner suggest this scenario. Helman & Rarner, supra note 1.
Halperin and Scheffer also believe that a State would be willing to relinquish control
over portions of its territory in order to resolve an intractable self-determination claim.
HALPERIN & SCHErFER, supra note 11, at 113-14. Originally, territories were placed
under trusteeship by their administering authority which, in turn, entered into a trus-
teeship agreement with the United Nations. U.N. CHARTER arts. 75, 77, 81.
128. ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
PoLrTIcAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 26-27 (1963).
129. Helman and Ratner insist that no State should be required to accept trustee-
ship. Instead, a State would voluntarily relinquish control over its internal and external
affairs for a defined period. Helman & Rarner, supra note 1, at 16. Johnson does not
discuss consent at all. Johnson, supra note 6. Would any government or insurgent
force voluntarily agree to follow the orders of an outside force, without retaining some
veto authority, or assent to be dependent in the manner trust territories were? In Cam-
bodia, the political forces made decisions between themselves, with the U.N. as a
faIlback decision-maker that would get involved only if the parties could not agree. In
Somalia, external forces were imposed under Chapter VII, and the results were disas-
trous. Hutchinson, supra note 117, at 629. Halperin and Scheffer raise the issue of
consent with respect to a State placing a portion of its territory under international
administration to resolve a self-determination claim. They believe that such consent
might be furnished because it would not predetermine any particular future arrange-
ment and could settle a seemingly insolvable dilemma for the involved State. HALPERIN
& SCHEFFER, supra note 11, at 113-14.
130. Gordon, supra note 8, at 537. Measures based on the consent of the parties
have not been viewed as intervention in U.N. practice.
131. The essence of sovereignty is being the sole legitimate authority within a terri-
tory. See also Sylvester, supra note 1, at 1317 (questioning whether there might be a
U.N. coup in these circumstances). The more likely possibility is a Chapter VII declara-
tion of a threat to the peace which would preclude the need for consent to intervene.
The limits of the Organization's powers under Chapter VII have been open-ended since
the end of the Cold War, but it is doubtful that it extends to imposing trusteeship on a
member of the Organization. Gordon, supra note 8, at 588. See infra part 1V.B.
Vol 28
1995 Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship
tion as it may no longer represent the governed. If the consent of the
government is open to challenge, then other entities might be able to con-
sent. Smaller, decentralized entities or warring factions might request
trusteeship or some other form of intervention. Different entities may
simultaneously call for different solutions, such as humanitarian interven-
tion, trusteeship, non-intervention, or other contradictory possibilities.'
3 2
Given the right to self-determination, perhaps none of these entities can
consent to a loss of independence, 3 3 suggesting that consent must come
directly from the people by plebiscite or some other democratic means.'
34
A final obstacle to voluntary assumption of trusteeship is the explicit
prohibition in Article 78 against applying the system to Member States.'
3 5
Given this prohibition, it is open to question whether the United Nations
can undertake this action, even with consent, because it would require the
Organization to undertake an act that directly contradicts the Charter.'
36
Thus, under the present Charter, there are impediments to a sovereign
State consenting to trusteeship. Unless we amend Article 78, or disqualify
certain States as Member States, voluntary trusteeship under the Charter
may be problematic.
B. Disintegrating States as Threats to the Peace
The Security Council has broad latitude in situations involving a threat to
the peace,' 37 which raises the question of whether such a finding
preempts Articles 77 and 78 of the Charter.138 State disintegration may be
the result of civil conflict, 139 and such internal conflicts have increasingly
been found to be threats to the peace. 14° The Security Council might
simply determine that a State should be under trusteeship; various factions
132. See Hutchinson, supra note 117, at 629 (discussing different factions in Somalia
seeking different responses from the U.N.).
133. See supra part Ill.
134. In situations where there is a high level of chaos and disorganization, this may
not be immediately feasible. In such a case obtaining consent should be of the highest
priority and carried out as soon as possible.
135. U.N. CHARTER art. 78; see discussion infra part HA
136. The Organization may be precluded from undertaking certain actions under its
own constitutional law regardless of an individual State's consent. Paul C. Szasz, Role of
the United Nations in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 345, 353-54 (1983).
137. Gordon, supra note 8, at 526. The Security Council is making this finding in an
ever expanding variety of situations. Id.
138. Helman and Ramer suggest that it does and that the Secretary-General's
peacebuilding proposals illustrate this point. Consequently, their article addresses situ-
ations where a disintegrating State is not a threat to the peace. Helman & Ramer, supra
note 1, at 16-18. Others have argued that the U.N.'s role in Somalia amounted to trus-
teeship. See Krauthammer, supra note 6. Given the legal status of trust territories, the
incompatibility of trusteeship with statehood, the absence of any trust agreement, and
Somalia's continuing status as a nation-State, it is apparent that trust status was not
legally contemplated by the Security Council.
139. It is certainly conceivable that a prolonged, intense civil conflict can lead to a
weakening of central authority and the breakdown of governmental ability. Somalia
may be the textbook example.
140. Gordon, supra note 8, at 562-81. The determinative factor does not seem to be
significant transboundary effects, although a long and particularly brutal civil conflict
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within a country might call for such intervention; or neighboring States
that are being overwhelmed by refugees or other external effects of inter-
nal turmoil might request international action. 14 1 The Security Council
has found State disintegration and its apparently accompanying humanita-
rian crisis a threat to the peace under Chapter VII.14 2
While a finding of a threat to the peace ameliorates domestic jurisdic-
tion concerns, 145 imposing trusteeship status would directly contravene
express provisions of the Charter. 44 This contravention would make it
difficult to find that imposing trusteeship is part of the implied powers
that arise out of the Security Council's broad authority to maintain inter-
national peace. This does not mean the Security Council is powerless. 145
Rather, the limitation indicates that the Council may not strip a State of its
statehood, sovereignty, or government and declare that its sovereignty is in
abeyance or that it resides in the United Nations.
C. Humanitarian Intervention
1. Definitions and Possible Scenarios
Humanitarian intervention occurs without the consent of the target gov-
could lead to significant transboundary effects such as a large outflow of refugees to
neighboring States, a spillover in fighting to other States, and regional instability.
141. See Sylvester, supra note 1, at 1317.
142. Gordon, supra note 8, at 553-55. In Resolution 794 on Somalia, the Security
Council used the following language:
Recognizing the unique character of the present situation in Somalia and
mindful of its deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature .... Determin-
ing that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia
further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of
humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security
.... Gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in
Somalia and underlining the urgent need for the quick delivery of humanita-
rian assistance in the whole of the country ....
S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. at 2-4, U.N. Doc. S/Res/794 (1992)
[hereinafter Resolution 794]. The Security Council relied upon a letter by the Secre-
tary-General where he specifically noted the lack of a government in Somalia. Letter
Dated 29 November 1992 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, S/24868 (30 November 1992). During the debate on Resolution 794,
many members of the Security Council noted the lack of government in Somalia as one
of the causes for the humanitarian crisis and the overall deterioration of the situation.
S/PV.3145, 3 December 1992, at 13 (Ecuador), 16 (China), 23-24 (Belgium), 41 (Vene-
zuela), 49 (India), 26 (Russian Federation noting total chaos and the danger of
disintegration).
143. The domestic jurisdiction question shifts because there is an exception to the
nonintervention prohibition when the Security Council finds and addresses a threat to
the peace. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7; see Gordon, supra note 8, at 538-44, 565-66.
144. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 77-78. Unlike the domestic jurisdiction exception, there
is no exception in the Charter permitting the imposition of trusteeship where there is a
threat to the peace.
145. See Gordon, supra note 8, at 563 (discussing possible actions that can be under-
taken upon a finding of a threat to the peace). Given the broad powers the Security
Council has recendy exercised under the rubric of threat to the peace, it is not incon-
ceivable that some Members would attempt to extend the Security Council's powers to
include trusteeship if trusteeship was thought desirable in a particular situation.
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emnment, 146 and includes both nonforcible and forcible action to stem
systemic and large-scale human rights violations. While the U.N. Charter
is not specific as to the particular human rights the U.N. will promote and
protect, there are many treaties that do enumerate various human rights
worthy of some degree of protection.
147
Imposing trusteeship would address human rights violations against
the inhabitants148 of a disintegrating State, which may result from acts of
perpetration or omission.149 The disintegration of governmental author-
ity may be accompanied by a situation where the pre-existing government
146. Arnison, supra note 18, at 200. Scholars have proposed various definitions of
humanitarian intervention, most of which limit the concept to forcible intervention.
According to David Scheffer,
the classical definition of humanitarian intervention is limited to those
instances in which a nation uses military force to intervene in the territory of
another state for the purpose of protecting a sizable group of indigenous peo-
ple from life-threatening or otherwise unconscionable infractions of their
human rights that the national government inflicts or in which it acquiesces.
DavidJ. Scheffer, Toward a Modem Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U. TOL L.
REv. 253, 264 (1992). Professor Brownlie states that the definitions of several commen-
tators include an immediate and extensive threat to fundamental human rights, partic-
ularly a widespread loss of human life; short-term use of force by a government in what
would otherwise be a violation of the sovereignty of a foreign State for the protection of
nationals of the acting State, and other States, from death or grave injury by removing
them from the territory of the foreign State; and the existence of conditions of immi-
nent danger and the occurrence or threat of a substantial deprivation of human rights
values. He notes two distinct preoccupations in these definitions: first, grave injury or
loss of life, and second, a broader and conceptual element of a threat to fundamental
human rights or a deprivation of human rights values. He also notes a number of
situations that would fall within these definitions, including, inter alia: genocide; delib-
erate or nondeliberate neglect by a government to take reasonable steps to remedy
famine conditions; and a social structure maintaining or promoting slavery or analo-
gous social relations. Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in HumNrTrrLuAN
INTERVErNMON AND THE UNrrED NA-ONS 13941 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973).
147. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 110; International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 110; International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 110; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, GA Res. 2670, 3 GAOR, pt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/
810, at 174 (Dec. 9, 1948); International Convention on theElimination ofAllForms of Racial
Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1966); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women, GA. Res. 180 (XXXIV 1979), 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980).
148. One commentator postulates that an important step beyond state-centrism is
implicit in the idea of an international system of human rights, since human rights
belong to individuals or groups of individuals rather than States. Brown, supra note 7,
at 204. Under traditional international law, the aspirations of individuals for justice,
peace, and security are served by a system in which territorially identified Nation-States
are internally and externally sovereign but are subject to the limiting norms of interna-
tional law. Gray C. Dorsey, The McDougal-Lasswell Proposal To Bring a World Public Order,
82 AM. J. INT'L L. 41, 41-42 (1988).
149. Promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms is one of the purposes of the United Nations. U.N. CHARTER pmbl., art. 1, para. 3.
Thus human rights are clearly matters of international concern. See Brown, supra note
7, at 205. Yet the Charter is not very specific regarding the human rights and freedoms
to be promoted. Id. at 206. It also contains principles that may potentially block inter-
national efforts to protect human rights, such as the sovereign equality of Member
States and the prohibition against U.N. intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of its
Members. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 1, 7.
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is at war with opposition or secessionist groups. In such circumstances, the
government (or opposition groups) may take measures that are inconsis-
tent with human rights.' 5 0
The domestic legal order in sovereign States generally serves as the
primary means of protecting human rights; the demise of that legal order
can lead to the demise of human rights protection. An inability to provide
basic governmental services, such as police protection, may subject citizens
to violent acts by warring factions, thugs, or other entities that arise in the
absence of police forces. 15 ' While the government itself may not be abus-
ing its citizens, it may be powerless to stop others from doing so. Other
human rights related consequences of government failure include wide-
spread food shortages and lack of medicine, shelter, and other services
necessary for survival. The delivery of food and other basic humanitarian
assistance has increasingly become the subject of humanitarian
intervention. 5 2
Further, the breakdown of central governmental authority often
leaves no single authority accountable for human rights violations. The
lack of central authority is particularly problematic because much of the
international inducement to improve human rights performance stems
from "shaming" established governments. 153 This technique is much less
effective against ill-identified groups contending for power' 5 4 or against a
powerless governing authority.
2. Nonintervention
The conclusion of the Cold War has reinvigorated discussion of the legal-
ity of humanitarian intervention,' 55 although its present legitimacy
appears to rest on such interventions being collective, rather than unilat-
eral, endeavors.' 56 Much of the discussion has focused on multilateral
intervention by the U.N. to halt human rights violations in a State or to
ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The competing principle
150. See Brown, supra note 7, at 209.
151. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 45-46.
152. Resolution 794, supra note 142.
153. Brown, supra note 7, at 210.
154. Id.
155. This is largely, but not solely, due to U.N. intervention in Iraq to protect the
Kurds, id. at 222, and due to U.N. intervention in the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.
156. Arnison, supra note 18, at 201. Amison notes that political motives were often
the rationale behind forcible intervention and believes that unilateral intervention is
now widely discredited. She also notes that collective efforts are preferable but could
also be subject to abuse. For example, a humanitarian motive for intervention may
mask the unwillingness of intervening countries to grant asylum on their own shores.
Id. Humanitarian intervention may also serve as a pretext for meddling in the political
affairs of other States. Developing States fear that larger powers will use collective
humanitarian intervention as a veiled excuse to maintain power over them. Thus the
unilateral use of force under the guise of humanitarian intervention remains controver-
sial, especially where there are issues surrounding the popular will of the local people,
the level of atrocities that warrant intervention, and the possibly ulterior motives of the
intervening States. See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contempo-
rary International Law, 84 Am. J. INT'L L 866, 875 (1990).
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of nonintervention, however, mitigates against such intervention in the
affairs of a sovereign State.
Nonintervention is a corollary of sovereign equality;' 5 7 it specifies
that no State or group of States has the right to intervene directly or indi-
rectly' 58 in the external or internal affairs of another State.' 5 9 Every sov-
ereign has the right to conduct its aff-irs without external interference.1
60
The U.N. Charter specifically prohibits the Organization from intervening
in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of Member
States. 1 1
A prohibited intervention is one which bears on matters each State is
permitted to decide freely under the principle of State sovereignty.16 2 Yet,
what each State is permitted to decide autonomously, i.e., what is con-
tained within the domestic jurisdiction of States, continually changes
157. Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 18, at 106; Anderson, supra note 9, at 128
(quoting Andrew Scott, Non-Intervention and ConditionalIntervention, 22J. INT'L Ar. 208
(1968)).
158. Recognition of a State's sovereignty, which is independence and freedom from
any external dominance, excludes the possibility of intervention by third parties. Jost
Delbrfick, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the United
Nations, 67 IND. LJ. 887, 889 (1992).
159. "Armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural ele-
ments are violations of international law." Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 62,
at 123. As Professor Damrosch notes, the norm of nonintervention has a long and
noble textual foundation. It is found in numerous international instruments including
universal, regional, and bilateral documents. Lori Fisler Damrosch, Changing Concep-
tions of Intervention in International Law, in EMERGING NoRMS OFJSTIFIED INTERVENTION,
supra note 10, at 93. The U.N. Charter prohibits intervention in the domestic jurisdic-
tion of Member States by the Organization, and several key principles implicitly reflect
the right of States to be free from intervention by other States and the correlative duty
to refrain from intervention. Id. See generally U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2, art. 2, para.
7, art. 55 (affirming the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples).
Additionally, art. 2, para. 1 provides that the Organization is based on the sovereign
equality of its members, and art. 2, para. 4 requires States to refi-ain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or polit-
ical independence of any State. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 1, 4.
160. Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 18, at 106. One objective of noninterven-
tion is autonomy, which aims to ensure that human beings organize themselves into
political communities and that they create their own institutions for the realization of
human liberty, free from external domination or repression. Daxnrosch, supra note
159, at 93. This principle is deeply enshrined in general international law. See Del-
brfick, supra note 158, at 889. It has its legal policy foundations in the principle of the
sovereign equality of States, one of the constitutive elements of the international legal
order.
161. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
162. These matters include the choice of a political, economic, and cultural system
and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of
coercion to require a particular alternative in these spheres. Obvious means of coer-
cion include direct or indirect military action, or indirect support for subversive or
terrorist armed activities in another state. Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 18, at
106.
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because it is dependent on the current state of international relations.163
The erosion of sovereignty has been accompanied by a reduction in mat-
ters within the domestic jurisdiction of States.'6 There has been consid-
erably more intervention by the Organization as more concerns have been
deemed international rather than domestic, 165 and this trend has acceler-
ated with the end of the Cold War. 166
Trusteeship, however, entails total assumption of the internal and
external affairs of a State, and, absent consent, it must be deemed inter-
vention in the domestic affairs of a State. If domestic jurisdiction has
shrunk to a point where all of the internal and external affairs of a State
are no longer within the domestic sphere, there is no longer a concept of
domestic jurisdiction; all has been transferred to the international sphere.
Moreover, trusteeship is the ultimate intervention because, given the legal
status of a trust territory, it is an intervention that may effectively destroy
the State as a sovereign entity. No matter how narrowly domesticjurisdic-
tion is defined, taking over all of the functions of the State would undoubt-
edly be intervention in its internal affairs. The issue then becomes when
such intervention is nonetheless permissible.
Professor Riddell-Dixon has noted two fundamental struggles at work:
respect for sovereignty versus demands for intervention, and communities
of peoples versus communities of States.' 67 On the one hand, Article 2,
paragraph 7 of the U.N. Charter compels nonintervention in the domestic
jurisdiction of Member States on the part of the Organization. 16 8 At the
same time, there is a perceived need for the U.N. to intervene within State
boundaries to uphold its responsibility in areas ranging from maintaining
international peace and security to protecting human rights.' 69 This bal-
ancing act may be particularly difficult when the proposed intervention is
trusteeship, which is extraordinary and overwhelming.
The Security Council presently seems more inclined to find that
humanitarian crises and human rights violations can pose threats to inter-
national peace, 170 even when these crises have little or no external
163. Advisory Opinion No. 4, Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco
(French Zone) on November 8, 1921, 1923 P.C.IJ. (ser. B) No. 4, at 156 [hereinafter
Nationality Decrees Advisory Opinion]; Gordon, supra note 8, at 534-35.
164. See RAJAN, supra note 71, at 11.
165. See id. at 7. A broad construction of the concept of nonintervention relies upon
interpreting the concept of sovereignty in a correspondingly expansive manner. See,
e.g., Dallmeyer, supra note 63, at 21-22; Gordon, supra note 8, at 528-29.
166. Gordon, supra note 8, at 520.
167. Riddell-Dixon, supra note 8, at 5. The other two are: elite collaboration versus
universal (or at least general) cooperation, and State equality versus concessions to the
powerful.
168. U.N. CHARTER art 2, para. 7.
169. Riddell-Dixon, supra note 8, at 6. Domesticjurisdiction has curtailed the U.N.'s
ability to deal with wars between subnational forces, to address the root causes of con-
flicts, to protect human rights, to promote social and economic justice, and to rectify
inequalities between States. Compare id. with Gordon, supra note 8.
170. In Resolution 688, the Security Council found the consequences of internal
repression to be a threat to international peace and security. The harsh quashing of
the Kurdish rebellion caused a massive number of Kurdish refugees to flee to Turkey
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effects.' 71 Moreover, given the debate surrounding humanitarian inter-
vention in Somalia, this current inclination to employ forcible interven-
tion to address human rights concerns may be more acceptable when
there is no functioning government. Member States repeatedly stressed
the humanitarian imperative and the lack of any functioning government
in Somalia. 172 The Security Council was also more willing than it had
been in previous situations to authorize the use of force to directly address
the humanitarian crisis. Given previous resolutions addressing equally
grievous situations, it may be that Member States do not have the same
level of uneasiness regarding sovereignty and nonintervention when there
is no functioning government. Thus, there may be a greater likelihood of
intervention when a humanitarian crisis is coupled with governmental
collapse.
Upon moving to the next phase of intervention in Somalia,
UNOSOM II,173 the U.N. undertook a broad range of activities that would
contribute to a secure environment in Somalia.174 The Security Council
did not, however, use Chapter VII to strip Somalia of statehood and
declare it under the control of the United Nations. Rather, every effort
was made to bring about national political reconciliation because the
Council recognized that it was ultimately up to the Somali people to
rebuild their country. 175 The Secretary-General noted that while
UNOSOM would assist in the rebuilding of their country, it would not
substitute its will for the will of the Somali people.'
76
and Iran, causing enormous apprehension in both countries. S.C. Res. 688, U.N.
SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991).
171. Security Council Resolution 794 found that the unfolding humanitarian crisis in
Somalia, and obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, were threats to inter-
national peace and security. It then authorized military intervention to establish a
secure environment for humanitarian relief efforts. The thrust of the resolution, and
the rationale supporting the use of force, was the internal humanitarian crisis and the
frustration of humanitarian assistance efforts. Resolution 794, supra note 142; Gordon,
supra note 8, at 553.
172. See supra note 142.
173. The initial United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was established
pursuant to Resolution 751 in 1992. S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg.
at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (1992). An expanded United Nations Operations in
Somalia (UNOSOM II) was established by Security Council Resolution 814. S.C. Res.
814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3188th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Resolution 814].
174. Resolution 814 relied on the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993 in
expanding the size and mandate of UNOSOM II. Resolution 814, supra note 173, at 4.
In this report, the Secretary-General delineated a number of primary military measures
that would lead to disarmament and peace. Further Report of the Secretary-Ceneral Pursuant
to Resolution 794, supra note 24.
175. Resolution 814, supra note 173, at 1. The Security Council stated, "Recognizing
that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation
and reconstruction of their own country .... " Id.
176. In the report upon which the Council relied in establishing UNOSOM II, the
Secretary-General stated:
The mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the
Somali people in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and political
life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national
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Given the broader definition of threat to the peace being employed
by the Security Council and the willingness to find that humanitarian cri-
ses are threats to the peace, the humanitarian imperative may well be the
most plausible rationale for imposing trusteeship. It is not inconceivable
that in the face of devastating atrocities and suffering, extraordinary solu-
tions might be considered necessary. It is in these circumstances that an
extension of the Security Council's powers might be most warranted. But
even here, it would seem that the Security Council is faced with Article 78
which prohibits applying trusteeship to Members of the U.N. The Security
Council might also hesitate to take the drastic step of imposing trustee-
ship, given the legal consequences of this determination. 177 Nonetheless,
it is most probable that trusteeship would be considered when governmen-
tal collapse leads to a horrific humanitarian crisis. 178 Whether it would be
adopted remains to be seen.
D. Are Disintegrating States Still States?
Given the near total breakdown in governmental ability which prompts
our discussion of trusteeship, we must ask ourselves if deteriorating States
have failed to the point that they are no longer States. Although the U.N.
Charter explicitly declares that the trusteeship system does not apply to
Member States, it could nonetheless apply to a disintegrating State that
has failed to the point that it has lost its claim to statehood. Perhaps failed
States have failed to the point that they are no longer States, 179 and by
inference, no longer Members of the United Nations.' 8 0
political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic govern-
ance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.
Notwithstanding the compelling necessity for authority to use enforcement
measures as appropriate, I continue to hold to my conviction that the political
will to achieve security, reconciliation and peace must spring from the Somalis
themselves. Even if it is authorized to resort to forceful action in certain cir-
cumstances, UNOSOM II cannot and must not be expected to substitute itself
for the Somali people. Nor can or should it use its authority to impose one or
another system of governmental organization.
Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 794, supra note 24, at 19-20.
177. See text and notes at part V, infra. If it did take such a step, perhaps it should be
to address the immediate humanitarian crises and to restore order to a point where it
could be determined if the peoples of the disintegrating State willingly choose
trusteeship.
178. As the level of human rights abuses wrought by a crisis decreases, the decision to
intervene on such an overwhelming level on human rights grounds will be less likely. It
remains to be seen what level of human rights abuses will unconditionally trigger large
scale multilateral intervention. The sweeping genocide in Rwanda in April 1994 was
known to the international community, but it did not precipitate immediate or decisive
international intervention. See generally Ruth E. Gordon, Humanitarian Intervention by the
United Nations and Iraq, Somalia and Haiti, 31 TEx. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 1996).
179. There is no specific organization that could make a binding decision on a par-
ticular case of extinction. Questions concerning the statehood of an entity remain a
problem which must be resolved by those States that come into official contact with an
organ claiming to possess the criteria of statehood. Broms, supra note 61, at 45.
180. Membership in the U.N. is limited to peaceloving states that accept the obliga-
tions contained in the Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and
willing to carry out these obligations. U.N. CnARTR art. 4, para. 1. But there are two
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The trusteeship system originally applied to Non-Self-Governing Ter-
ritories (NSGTs). Therefore, to be subjected to the trusteeship system, a
State would have to be a NSGT of some kind.' 8 ' If a state has failed to the
point of extinction, perhaps it can be categorized as a territory, rather
than a State, and thus as an entity that is eligible for trusteeship. Extinc-
tion has generally meant that a new State has replaced the State found to
be extinct. This would not be true in the case of a disintegrating State,
however. Rather, it is conceivable that a disintegrating State is a territory
that is non-self-governing in the sense that there is no central govern-
ment.182 Admittedly, the term Non-Self-Governing Territories meant enti-
ties governed by an outside colonial authority, rather than a state that
lacks central authority, and thus this characterization would expand the
meaning of the term.
Customary international law does not supply definite criteria for
determining when a State ceases to exist.' 8 3 Moreover, scholars have not
types of membership in the U.N.-original Members and later-admitted Members.
The original Members were States that participated in the U.N. Conference on Interna-
tional Organization or had previously signed the U.N. Declaration of 1 January 1942,
and had signed and ratified the Charter. Id. art. 3. Original Members did not have to
fulfill the conditions mentioned in art. 4, para. 1, and there were several Members
whose statehood was at least doubtful. Broms, supra note 61, at 45-46; RUSSEL, supra
note 55, at 350-51, 351 n.3. Later-admitted Members have had to meet the require-
ments in art. 4, and no non-State has been admitted as a full Member in the ensuing 50
years. Non-State entities such as the PLO have been accorded some of the incidents of
membership in the U.N. system. See KIRGIS, supra note 76, at 166-75.
Perhaps loss of statehood does not automatically preclude membership status.
Expulsion is by decision of the Organization, but the Charter does not provide for our
scenario because expulsion is limited to persistent violators of the principles contained
in the Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 6. Because membership is limited to peaceloving
States that are willing and able to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter,
one could argue that failed States are unable to carry out the obligations contained in
the U.N. Charter. However, given the admission and continued presence of micro-
States, this argument is problematic. The U.N. Charter did not contemplate that a
State might simply cease to exist with no substitute entity rising in its stead.
181. U.N. CHARTER, art. 77. Another alternative is simply to apply the trusteeship
system to sovereign States. However, this alternative seems to contradict the definition
of sovereignty, which includes independence and self-government, versus tutelage,
which applies to those deemed in need of being governed by others. Another possibil-
ity is to declare some States to be somewhere in between sovereign States and trust
territories.
182. This differs from extinction as traditionally defined, where the extinct State has
been totally displaced by another State. When a State disintegrates, a strong central
authority may be absent while there may be functioning local mechanisms. See, e.g.,
BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN: AFRICA AND THE CURSE OF THE NATION-
STATE 312-14 (1992) (describing such instances in Africa).
183. KRYSTYNA MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 7 (2d ed. 1968). Although writers have generally agreed as to what events consti-
tute the birth of a State, no one has examined the events leading to the extinction of a
State at any great length. Id. No one has tried to develop a conventional solution to
the problem, nor have any international judicial decisions issued pronouncements on
the subject Id. The question of a State's continuity does not arise under normal and
settled conditions. On the contrary, it arises in circumstances giving rise to legitimate
doubts about the continued existence of the State concerned. "There must be a shock
grave enough to cast doubt on the State's survival, such as belligerent occupation,
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studied the problem of a State that no longer functions and has no new
State which claims to operate in its place.' 8 4 Continuity, identity, and
extinction have depended on variants of the basic criteria of statehood:185
a defined territory,' 86 a permanent population, 187 a government,' 8 8 the
capacity to enter into international relations,189 independence, 190 and, as
revolution, or revolutionary dismemberment." Id. at 4. In the case of an extinct State,
that shock would presumably be the disintegration of the structures and abilities of the
central government, to the point where it is no longer functioning at all, or it is func-
tioning on an insignificant level.
184. Generally the inquiry has been whether a State has vanished and another stands
in its stead under a new legal order, or whether the previously existing State continues
as the same entity. See, e.g., CRAWoRD, supra note 56, at 417-20; MAREK, supra note 188,
at 1, 7-14. Thus, there are claims of extinction following internal revolution, territorial
changes, or belligerent occupation. Revolution does not affect State identity and con-
tinuity. Id. at 7. With failed States, we are left with no central authority rather than a
different central authority. Perhaps the closest analogy would be to internal revolution,
with disintegration viewed as a revolution of a different type. Marek defines revolution
as "every change in the legal order of the State other than one brought about by consti-
tutional changes." Id. at 25. Disintegration would be a change in the legal order that is
not brought about by constitutional means. Nonetheless, the result is different from a
revolution that leaves a central authority exerting State functions. Here we are left with
decentralized (or no) authority.
185. These qualifications, which the state should possess as a matter of international
law, are found in the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat.
3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (also known as the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties
of States) [hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
186. A reasonably stable political community must be in control of a certain geo-
graphic area. What matters is the effective establishment of a political community
(rather than fully defined frontiers). BROWNUE, supra note 19, at 73.
187. This criterion is intended to be used in association with the requirement for a
defined territory and connotes a stable community. Id. From the standpoint of inter-
national law, the permanent population is identical to the nation. From the social or
anthropological perspective, and thus from the perspective of domestic politics, this is
not necessarily the case. Eide, supra note 33, at 140. In international law, "nation" is
practically synonymous with the word "State." For example, when Article 15 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights provides that "[e]veryone has a right to a national-
ity," it means everyone has a right to citizenship. Id. at 141; see Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, supra note 110, art. 15. However, different usages of the word are also
widespread. For instance, the Kurds consider themselves a nation without a State.
Eide, supra note 33, at 141.
188. The existence of effective government with centralized administrative and legis-
lative organs is the best evidence of a stable political community. BROWNLE, supra note
19, at 73. Some States arose before a well-organized government came into existence.
Moreover, the principle of self-determination was set against the concept of effective
government when lack of an effective government was suggested as a rationale for the
continuation of colonial rule. The relevant issue then was determining the legal pur-
pose for which government was ineffective. The requirement of an existing govern-
ment as a requisite of statehood at times approaches, and may overlap with, the
requirement for independence. HIGGINS, supra note 128, at 21.
189. The capacity to enter into international relations can be equated with indepen-
dence, which may also be described as external sovereignty. It means that a State is
subject to no other authority except that of international law. HIGGINS, supra note 128,
at 26.
190. While Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention does not include independence,
Article 3, which proclaims the declaratory character of recognition, states that before
recognition the State has the right to defend its integrity and independence. Monte-
video Convention, supra note 185, art. 3. This assumes that a State possesses indepen-
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subsidiary criteria, permanence and recognition. 19' Arguably, a com-
pletely non-functioning government indicates the disappearance of sev-
eral of the indicia of statehood, such as plenary authority over a territory
and population and the ability to enter into relations with other States.
19 2
A State may become extinct with the disappearance of one of its ele-
ments, and it is rather easy to determine extinction as to the material ele-
ments of a State. 193 Yet, a State is not necessarily extinguished by
substantial changes in territory,'9 4 population, or government,' 9 5 or in
dence, which it has the right to defend. MAREK, supra note 183, at 165; Montevideo
Convention, supra note 185, art. 3. Independence means that a State is not subject to
the authority of any other State or group of States. MAREK, supra note 183, at 165-66
(quoting Customs Regime Between Germany and Austria, 1931 P.C.IJ. (ser A/B 57)
No. 40 (sep. opinion ofJudge Anzilotti)). As to the issue of whether statehood requires
legal or actual independence, HIGINS, supra note 128, at 26, it is apparent that absolute
independence is impossible, given the increasing interdependence of the international
community. See discussion, supra part ll.C.
191. These secondary criteria may be important in doubtful or marginal cases.
CRAWFoRD, supra note 56, at 403. If statehood is to depend on recognition by others,
the extinction of a State would depend on the will of third States. This raises the peren-
nial problem of the constitutive versus the declaratory nature of recognition. As the
source of the continued existence of a State, recognition would have to be constitutive
rather than declaratory. Moreover, it would have to be a legal, and not a political, act.
MAREK, supra note 183, at 131. By adopting the constitutive theory, however, the State
may continue to exist for some and not for others. This may be a particularly difficult
problem when addressing the continued existence of a State, which may be more con-
troversial than the birth of a State. Id. at 132-33. Practice, however, indicates that in
matters of both recognition and nonrecognition, objective international law determines
the existence or nonexistence of a State. A State exists in accordance with objective
norms alone, and the denial of such existence must equally be based on objective
norms. Id. at 145. It is implausible to have objective criteria for a State's birth and pure
consent as the criterion for its further existence. Id.
192. Historically, this inability to enter into foreign relations has been due to another
State exercising this authority on behalf of the State or another State controlling the
manner and method of conducting foreign relations. Yet, the existence of a govern-
ment in a territory is a condition precedent for the normal conduct of international
relations. CRAWFoRD, supra note 56, at 47.
193. MAR,, supra note 183, at 7. Thus, if the territory were to disappear, i.e., as with
an island sinking, the State would clearly cease to exist. The same could be said for a
population that disappeared by moving elsewhere. Obviously, these are not the typical
cases.
194. State practice, judicial decisions, and doctrine confirm that substantial changes
in territory do not affect the identity of a State. Id. at 16-18. This conclusion stems
from the practical concern for the continued validity of the treaty rights and obligations
of a State that has either lost or acquired territory. Id. at 15. One present example
would be the devolution of the USSR to Russia. The USSR lost a substantial portion of
its territory, but its continuity as a State went unquestioned. One exception may be if
the loss in territory is either total or substantial. Id. at 23-24.
195. Id. at 7. Examples include revolution, dismemberment, merger with another
State, and debellatio. One theory is that the yardstick for determining State extinction
is found exclusively in the absence of the State's legal order. Id. at 8 (citing Kelsen).
The classic exception has been belligerent occupation where the occupied State sur-
vives even though its legal order may have become totally ineffective throughout the
territory. Id. In the post-World War II period, the Allied Control Council was eventu-
ally recognized as the government of Germany after the collapse of an effective or rec-
ognized German government. Moreover, the Berlin Declaration did not purport to
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some cases by all three.1 96 International law protects the State's existence
against possible dangers that are not illegal per se, such as territorial
changes, revolutions, and belligerent occupations. 197 Furthermore, there
is a strong presumption in favor of the continuance, and against the
extinction, of an established State.198 Extensive civil strife and the break-
down of order through foreign invasion have not affected the personali-
ties of established States. 199 Such States have also been immune to
extinction because of revolution 20 0 and prolonged anarchy.20 1 In apply-
ing statehood criteria, questions of recognition, acquiescence, 202 and the
view of the entity concerned, 20 3 have been important, but not decisive.
Given the strong presumption in favor of retaining international per-
sonality, and taking into account recognition and the views of the entity
concerned, failed States do not appear to have forfeited their status as
States. In describing disintegrating States, commentators have primarily
focused on the inability to fulfill essential governmental functions because
annex Germany. Given these two factors, Germany continued to exist as a State. CRAw-
FORD, supra note 56, at 274.
196. CRAWFORD, supra note 56, at 417. Extinction will result, however, where there is
effective submersion or disappearance of separate State organs into those of another
State over any considerable period of time. Id. This is especially true where no illegality
is involved and where the previous State's organs voluntarily relinquished their separate
identity (i.e., where there is a union). Id.
197. MARFx, supra note 183, at 549.
198. CRAWFORD, supra note 56, at 417; MAREK, supra note 183, at 548. This reluctance
to find State extinction stems from the nature of international law, which is based on
the co-existence of separate independent States. Id. at 548. It is also explained by the
natural tendency to provide for a maximum amount of security in international rela-
tions. Since extinction, absent universal secession, would abruptly discontinue a State's
rights and obligations, this would not portend well for stability. Id.
199. MAREY, supra note 183, at 24-82.
200. Id. at 24-73. Marek states:
If [the] legal order breaks down in an already existing, i.e., fully delimited State,
its territorial and personal delimitation under international law remains .... It
is true that the basic norm of the revolutionary State has been replaced by a
new basic norm, with no internal legal connection between the two; but the old
basic norm has not been replaced by the basic norm of any other state. The
territorial and personal delimitation of the State concerned remaining in prin-
ciple unchanged, the new basic norm has been produced from within the same
international delimitation as the old one, and is valid for the same international
delimitation.
Id. at 50.
201. CRAWFORD, supra note 56, at 417.
202. Id. at 417. Thus, another theory conditions continued existence on the unwill-
ingness of third States to recognize debellatio and to continue their recognition of a
conquered State. MAREK, supra note 183, at 8. One problem with this theory is that
States do not apply principles of recognition in a uniform manner. Id.
203. Marek notes that the will and decision of the State alone cannot be dispositive.
Rather, the State's own will and conviction may be admitted to a very limited extent as a
controvertible piece of evidence of its identity and continuity. Such evidence will be
stronger if it is found not only in diplomatic correspondence, negotiations, and the
like, but also on the internal level where it is not intended to produce effects in the
outside world. But even so, it will at best be very weak evidence which must yield before
more objective criteria. It does not constitute a test in itself. MArxK, supra note 183, at
129.
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of civil war or weak, collapsing governmental structures. 20 4 The funda-
mental problem is the breakdown of effective government; the other indi-
ces of statehood remain in place. Yet, this scenario alone does not appear
to have led to a loss of statehood. Territory and population remain in
place, and the international community continues to treat these States as
States, thereby recognizing that these States remain sovereign entities.
20 5
The peoples of these States also appear to continue to view them-
selves as citizens of States, even where they are trying to carve out another
area and form a smaller State.20 6 Governments or insurgent factions con-
tinue to operate on the international stage,20 7 and they continue to view
themselves as vested with sovereign power.20 8 Since we are still dealing
with sovereign States that remain Members of the United Nations,
20 9 trus-
teeship cannot be imposed simply by finding that these States are no
longer States.
However, this argument can be maintained with some degree of con-
fidence only for the immediate future; indeed, the situations described by
Kaplan and Sylvester may soon warrant a different analysis.2 10 A contin-
204. For example, Helman and Ratner distinguish between stages of decay based on
varying degrees of central governmental deterioration. Helman & Ramer, supra note 1,
at 13-17. Johnson's rationale for re-imposing colonialism is the need for outside con-
trol of governmental operations where governments are unable to supply basic services.
Johnson, supra note 6.
205. For instance, in Somalia, the U.N. found a threat to the peace partly in order to
avoid obtaining consent to intervene. Thus, the Organization acted as if there were
some form of a sovereign entity. Furthermore, aid agencies continue to deal with gov-
ernments. Because there is no particular body with the authority to decide this ques-
tion, determining the statehood of any entity depends upon the members of the
community of nations. Broms, supra note 61, at 47.
206. For example, northern Somalia, which is made up primarily of members of the
Issak clan, has attempted to cede from Somalia and form the independent State of
Somaliland Republic. Clark, supra note 24, at 112.
207. This is true even in Somalia where factions are in control of territories and
engage in international negotiations. Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Resolution 794, supra note 24, at 3-5 (detailing U.N. coordination of efforts to facilitate a
political settlement between the various Somali factions). Security Council Resolutions
have also been directed at these entities. U.N. SCOR Res. 733, 3039th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/733 (1992) (seeking the commitment of all parties to permit humanitarian
assistance). Moreover, Somalia still retains a seat at the United Nations. THE WORLD
ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FAcrs 1995, at 845-46 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1995) [hereinaf-
ter WORLD ALMANAC 1995); Resolution 814, supra note 173; The Situation in Somalia:
Report of the Secretary-Genera4 U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess. at 1-3, U.N. Doc. S/25168 (1993).
208. For example, some factions in Somalia sought to keep the U.N. out, and the
U.N. dealt with them partially as sovereign entities. Hutchinson, supra note 117. There
may be little choice in situations of this type. SeeWoRLD AuiANAC 1995, supra note 207.
209. All of the States cited as failed or failing are still Members of the United
Nations.
210. The situations described by these commentators indicate that something more
may be at issue. Both describe not only a breakdown of governmental authority, but
also the disintegration of borders and something akin to a loss of national conscious-
ness. In these circumstances, a closer examination of whether the State survives may be
warranted because there is no functioning central government, borders, or defined
population (if we equate people with nation). Thus, we may have the disappearance, as
opposed to changes, of a number of the elements of statehood. In such cases, we may
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ued lack of central authority may portend extinction if it reaches a point
where there is an inability to engage in international relations and an inca-
pacity to govern the territory and people over an extended period of time.
Moreover, prolonged periods without central authority may lead the pop-
ulation to fail to view themselves as part of a State. At some point, the
objective facts may indicate extinction.2 1'
International personality212 is conferred by the makers of interna-
tional law-that is, by States.2 13 The international community has not pre-
viously faced the total breakdown of a State unaccompanied by some other
centralized entity2 14 claiming statehood. The potential reaction of States
in these circumstances cannot be stated with any certainty.2 15 Thus, we
could face a situation where some States are no longer recognized as such
by the international community. An assessment could be made by the
piecemeal decisions of individual States or through the collective assess-
face an unknown occurrence that merits a different analysis. Such inquiry is beyond
the scope of this article, however, and will be examined by the author elsewhere.
211. One problem here is the absence of some other State standing in place of the
extinct State. Extinction has often meant that a State is replaced by another State.
212. International personality is legal capacity under the international legal system.
It is the status enjoyed by subjects of international law, denoting their capacity to bear
legal rights and duties under international law and making them the direct addressees
of the rules of the system. Cheng, supra note 79, at 23.
213. There are problems with this, however. If the nonrecognized State and its
inhabitants are neither protected nor bound by international law, then logically such
State is free to act as it deems fit towards the international community and vice versa.
For example, the unrecognized State could be freely invaded by other States or could
itself invade others, without committing any illegal act and without any legal remedy.
The citizens of the defunct State could be treated as outlaws in the territory of third
States and vice versa. MAREK, supra note 183, at 146-47. Therefore, Marek rejects recog-
nition as a test of State continuity and identity. Such a test is not reliable because of its
inherent relativity. "[I] t withdraws the question of continued existence from the realm
of objective norms and makes it dependent upon the will of third States," and it "may
place the continuity of a State in jeopardy." Although recognition is not constitutive,
and does not possess a legal character, but rather is "declaratory and political, [it] is still
of considerable value as [prima facie] evidence" of extinction. Id. at 159. "Recognition
granted or withheld in accordance with the principles of international law, is conclusive
evidence.... Recognition granted or withheld for reasons which have nothing to do
with these principles, but are overwhelmingly political to the extent of disregarding
them, is not conclusive evidence." Id. at 160. Therefore, it is not the recognition, but
the conformity with international law which is dispositive. Id.
214. There may be political formations on a more local level. DAVIDSON, supra note
182, at 294-95.
215. Much would depend on politics. In other words, it depends on whether some
States have an interest in finding that other States are extinct. This would hinge on the
course of action that would follow such a finding. Where the intention is to take over a
State and put it under international supervision, a State could be deemed extinct. How-
ever, given that the international community is a community of States, it is unlikely that
States would lightly begin to find other States extinct. This is especially true if the
finding is made by a broadly representative body, such as the General Assembly, which
consists of many small, weak States. Even the Security Council would have to deal with
the political and legal consequences that would follow such a finding. Thus, the cir-
cumstances would probably be dire.
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ment of some organ of the U.N.2 16 Presumably, the purpose would be to
divest the affected State of sovereignty and its perquisites. The rights and
duties accruing to the entity as a sovereign State would disappear and the
entity could possibly be subjected to international supervision without its
consent. Evidently the international community is not ready to take such
a drastic step. Accordingly, the response thus far has been to emphasize
continuity. The Charter's prohibition on applying trusteeship to Member
States presently remains an obstacle to applying trusteeship to these
entities.
V. The Legal Status of Trust Territories
A. Legal Personality of Dependent Territories
Historically, States have been the entities possessing international person-
ality with its full panoply of rights, duties, and obligations.2 17 Colonies,
international protectorates, and other dependencies possessed a lesser sta-
tus.21 8 In legal terms, colonies were part of the colonial polity. There was
the potential for administering powers to view their mandate and trust
territories in a manner analogous to their colonial possessions. Thus, the
crucial issue with respect to mandates and trusts was their legal status vis A
vis the administering State.2 19
Trust or mandate status was an improvement on colonial status. Colo-
nies explicitly lacked international personality and could not legally con-
test their treatment by the colonizer.220 They were not considered
separate juridical institutions, and the metropolitan government exercised
216. For example, individual States could withdraw recognition or assistance. The
General Assembly could pass a resolution on a particularly dismal situation where it
believes that action is desirable. While such a finding might not be conclusive, it might
be evidence of extinction. Whether the Security Council could or would make such a
finding is a complex question for which there is little or no authority. Such a finding
may also be politically untenable for a small unrepresentative body which could be
acting beyond its competence.
217. A subject of the law is an entity capable of possessing international rights and
duties and of maintaining its rights by bringing international claims. The principal
formal contexts involving the question of personality include: the capacity to make
treaties and agreements valid on the international plane, the capacity to make claims in
respect of breaches of international law, and the employment of privileges and immuni-
ties from national jurisdiction. BROWNLIE, supra note 19, at 60.
218. Public international law provides the criteria for determining whether a particu-
lar entity is sufficiently independent of other legal persons and whether States or orga-
nizations have a separate legal personality. Id. at 74-76.
219. Our problem is the legal status of a trust entity vis a vis the U.N., which may
raise different issues. In one sense, mandate or trust status was analogous to the colo-
nial power ceding aspects of its sovereignty over a part of itself, because it shared the
responsibility for administration with the international community. This differed from
a pure colonial situation where sovereignty over colonial possessions was complete.
Nonetheless, even with some international supervision through mandates and trusts,
the administering power retained considerable sovereign powers over mandate and
trust territories. Most countries under mandate status were taken from the losers of the
First World War, and trusts were generally former mandates that were transferred to the
new system.
220. Anghie, supra note 16, at 494-47.
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plenary authority over these territories. 22 ' Article 73 of the U.N. Charter,
which applied to U.N. Members administering NSGTs, may have mini-
mally limited the sovereignty of administering States over their colonial
possessions. 222
Both the League of Nations Mandate System and the U.N. Trustee-
ship System gave international status to administered territories. Extrane-
ous agencies-international organizations and their members-were
given the task of supervising the undertakings of the administering pow-
ers.2 23 The Trusteeship Agreement for Somaliland expressly vested sover-
eignty in the people of the territory, thereby expressing the right to self-
221. CR.wroRD, supra note 56, at 199. Under international law, the territory became
part of the metropolitan State's territory by "subsequent 'grant, usage, sufferance or
other... means'." Id. "The absence of formal annexation was not a barrier to charac-
terizing territory as part of a particular State, where the authority exercised was in fact
plenary." Id. at 199-200. Colonial protectorates were almost universally found in Africa.
Id. at 200. Some colonial protectorate agreements were treaties made with recognized
African States or with tribes with legal status.
The continuous accretion of powers by usage and acquiescence to the protect-
ing State was-by virtue of the Berlin Act procedure--opposable to the parties
to that Act and in practice a matter at the protecting State's discretion. As a
result, the protecting State had international full powers: it was competent, for
example, to cede protected territory without consent and in breach of the pro-
tectorate agreements.
Id.
Judge Fitzmaurice found in the Northern Cameroon case that the Republic of Came-
roon, which at the time of the alleged wrong was a colony, was not then in existence as a
State with a separate international persona, and therefore it could claim no injury.
Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.CJ. 15, 129 (Dec. 2) (separate opin-
ion ofJudge Fitzmaurice). Judge Fitzmaurice also found that the trust conferred rights
only on Members of the U.N. The applicant State (Republic of Cameroon) was not
then a Member of the U.N. or even in existence as a State and separate international
persona over most of the relevant period. Id. Judge Bustamante, in his dissenting opin-
ion, argued that the Republic of Cameroon could demand the investigation of facts
prior to its political emancipation. He likened it to the case of an infant examining his
guardian's acts of administration during his minority. Id. at 169-70. CRAWFoan, supra
note 56, at 395.
222. CA wroRD, supra note 56, at 363. "To the extent that 'sovereignty' implies the
unfettered right to control, or to dispose of, the territory in question, the obligations of
Article 73(b), and the associated principle of self-determination, substantially limit the
sovereignty of the Administering State." Id. at 364. Crawford asserts that it is uncertain
"whether Chapter XI purports to deprive administering States of sovereignty over colo-
nial territories, or that subsequent practice could have that effect." Id. However,
whether sovereignty then resided in the people of the territory or elsewhere was
another matter. Yet, as the right of self-determination matured, it was increasingly
asserted that the status of colonial territories was separate from that of the ruling power.
The Declaration on Friendly Relations states that the territory of a colony or other non-
self-governing territory has a status that is separate and distinct from the territory of the
State administering it. See supra note 62. This separate and distinct status exists until
the people of the colony or NSGT exercise their right of self-determination in accord-
ance with the U.N. Charter.
223. BROWNLIE, supra note 19, at 62. The particular instrument establishing this
authority could be interpreted in such a way that it gives the populations concerned a
direct legal interest in carrying out the undertakings contained in the instrument,
although their limited legal capacity required that they should have a representative.
Id.
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determination,2 24 and firmly depriving Italy of sovereign rights over the
territory.225 Six trust agreements, however, provided that the trusts were
to be administered as integral parts of the administering power,226 raising
questions as to whether sovereignty vested in the administering
authority.
2 2 7
In the 1950 Advisory Opinion on the Status of South West Africa
(Namibia), Judge McNair described a special regime for mandate and
trust territories where the doctrine of sovereignty did not apply.228 These
systems were a new species of international government which did not fit
into previous understandings of sovereignty. Sovereignty over a mandated
territory was in abeyance, and when the inhabitants of the territory
obtained recognition as an independent State, sovereignty was revived and
vested in the new State.229 Thus, these entities were not part of the
administering state.
In a subsequent Advisory Opinion on Namibia, Judge Ammoun
found that in colonial or mandate paradigms, virtual sovereignty resided
in the people who were deprived of it by domination or tutelage. 230
According to Judge Ammoun, sovereignty was inherent in every people,
including those subject to mandate. Sovereignty had simply been
deprived of freedom of expression temporarily.23 ' Some commentators
224. CRAWFORD, supra note 56, at 336 n.10.
225. CHOWDHURI, supra note 92, at 231. The United States also stated that it did not
intend to extend its sovereignty over the Pacific Islands. Id.
226. Id. at 232-333. See, e.g., Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Ruanda-Urund4
U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 62d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/258 (1946), which provided in Article 5
that the administering authority (Belgium) "shall have full powers of legislation, admin-
istration and jurisdiction in the territory of Ruanda-Urundi and shall administer it in
accordance with Belgian law as an integral part of Belgian territory, subject to the provi-
sions of the Charter and of this Agreement." Reprinted in DUNCAN HALL, MANDATES,
DEPENDENCIES AND TRusTESHIP 354 (1948). Representatives of the trustees assured the
General Assembly, at the time of the approval of the trusteeship agreements, that the
terms were drafted for administrative convenience, and there was no intent to diminish
the political identity of trust territories. CHOWDHURI, supra note 92, at 233.
227. Indeed, Kelsen argued that, "the state, which in its capacity as a territorial sover-
eign places a territory under trusteeship and becomes the administering authority,
retains its sovereignty, though restricted by the trusteeship agreement, unless there is a
contrary provision in the agreement." HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNrrED NATIONS
690 (1950).
228. Status of South-West Africa, supra note 95, at 146, 150 (separate opinion of Sir
Arnold McNair). He found that the mandate and trusteeship systems were new institu-
tions with a new relationship between the territory and its inhabitants on the one hand,
and the government which represented them internationally on the other. Id.
229. Id. at 150.
230. Status of Namibia, supra note 95, at 69 (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun).
He also held that South-West Africa, as a German colony, was a subject of international
law that was distinct from the German State, and that although it possessed interna-
tional sovereignty, it lacked the exercise thereof. This legal personality, however, was
denied by a law which is now obsolete. Id. at 68. Moreover, the mandate did not con-
note annexation of the territory.
231. Id. This view was also expressed by some Members of the U.N. For example, it
was observed that
Nations which have not reached full self-government, as it were, incomplete
States which, while possessing the element of population and territory, lack
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have noted that this supposition may have more moral and legal validity
than other theories if the aim of full self-government or independence is
achieved.2 32
This issue has not been definitely resolved.2 33 Others have argued
that sovereignty vested in the U.N. because of the Organization's right to
approve trust agreements and to determine the final disposition of trust
territories. However, the consent of the administering authority was
equally indispensable in establishing the trust agreement. 23 4 Thus, it is
doubtful that sovereignty resided in the U.N. when there was an agree-
ment between the U.N. and an administering power.
It may be a different case, however, if the administering authority is
the U.N. instead of a State. Administering powers had the capacity to
incorporate their trust territories into economic and other forms of union
with their colonial possessions, 23 5 to exploit resources, alienate land,
merge the territory with its own, or to use the territory for its own national
purposes.23 6 The Member States of the U.N., on the other hand, wanted
to supervise and exercise control so that the territory could achieve inde-
pendence at the earliest possible moment.23 7
Presumably the U.N. as an administering authority would covet inde-
pendence and would not harbor proprietary or other similar interests in a
modern trust territory.238 Thus, conceivably sovereignty could reside in
only government or, in other words, the capacity of self-determination and self
rule. For that reason, possession of their own territory is the inalienable right
of the non-self-governing peoples and never of the administrators, whose only
power over such territory can be compared with the powers under civil law of a
guardian over a ward. We can no more speak of the sovereignty of an adminis-
tering Power over a non-self-governing territory than we can speak of a guard-
ian's ownership of his ward's property.
U.N. Doc. A/PV.485, at 146 (1954).
232. CHOWDHURI, supra note 92, at 234.
233. Crawford concludes that the concept of sovereignty is inapplicable to interna-
tional regimes of divided competencies such as the mandate and trusteeship systems.
CRAWFORD, supra note 56, at 366 n.10. Antony Anghie postulates that the issue of where
sovereignty over mandated territories resided was never satisfactorily resolved. Possible
candidates included the League of Nations, the mandatory, and the mandated territory
itself, which could be characterized as possessing "latent sovereignty." Anghie, supra
note 16, at 466. Thus, he asserts that mandates were not under the sovereignty of any
State, but were of a status that was new in international law. Id.
234. CHOWDURI, supra note 92, at 232. The Organization could not establish itself as
an administering authority or confer trusteeship administration upon a State by a uni-
lateral act. Professor Brownlie asserts that the U.N. cannot have territorial sovereignty,
although it has been prepared to assume administrative functions in the context of
maintaining international peace and security. BROWNLIE, supra note 19, at 175. Pre-
sumably this reasoning is based on the U.N. not being a State.
235. CHOWDHURI, supra note 92, at 88-89.
236. Id. at 90-91, 277-81.
237. Id. at 91-92.
238. The United Nations is an intergovernmental organization, however, that
reflects the propensities of its Members. Given the diversity of its membership, presum-
ably no one view would prevail. Yet, some Members are much more powerful than
others and might require that their views prevail. Usually these perspectives will benefit
those espousing them. Witness the calls for market economies and the like in countries
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the U.N., which would have plenary authority over the internal and exter-
nal affairs of the State. This is an odd conclusion, however, as heretofore
only States have possessed sovereignty.23 9
An alternative argument follows Judge Ammoun's reasoning in the
Advisory Opinion on Namibia. In a modem trust system, sovereignty
could reside in the people who are temporarily deprived of its exercise by
tutelage. Another alternative is that sovereignty is suspended and will be
revived when the entity is again recognized as independent. But if sover-
eignty is latent, in abeyance, or the people are deprived of its exercise,
submission to trusteeship is giving up sovereignty, if only temporarily. The
State would be ceding an important part of its statehood and international
personality by permitting some other entity to act on its behalf. Thus,
trust status and sovereignty, an indispensable aspect of statehood, are
incompatible.
B. Can a Modem Trust Remain a State?
This leads to our final issue of the degree to which independence or sover-
eignty may be ceded to another entity without a resulting loss of state-
hood. This question has been an ongoing enigma.24° The dilemma is
further complicated by the State ceding its independence to an Organiza-
tion instead of to another State.
The sovereignty of a State includes the right to limit itself by entering
into treaty obligations. 24' Moreover, States can "commit suicide" by enter-
ing into a union with another State, whereby one of the States disap-
pears.242 Moreover, States have entered into protectorates and other
semidependent classes.
James Crawford distinguishes protected States from international pro-
tectorates. 243 Protected States qualify as States under international law
despite protection. 244 For such States, the necessary prerequisites for
independence include retaining substantial authority in internal affairs,
some degree of understanding and influence over the foreign affairs pow-
experiencing difficulties. Presumably, this benefits some nations, especially the more
economically powerful.
289. The ICJ has held that the United Nations has international personality but not
all of the attributes of international personality possessed by States. Reparation for
Injuries, supra note 79, at 179.
240. HiGrs, supra note 128, at 26-27. The question is: "at what stage has a state
consented to such limitations on its independence that it is 'shorn of the last vestige of
power'. .. ?" Id.
241. S.S. Wimbledon Case, 1923 P.C.Ij. (ser. A) No. 1, at 25 (Jan. 16).
242. HIGGINS, supra note 128, at 27.
243. CaRswroan, supra note 56, at 188-208.
The old concept of a really independent, but protected, State had disappeared by
1815. Instead a variety of political forms was developed, which sought to derive the
greatest advantage for European States in terms of accessibility of markets and bases,
and non-availability of territory to competitors, with the least disadvantages in terms of
actual administrative responsibility. These entities were called protectorates but had
little in common with classical protectorates. Id.
244. Id. at 188.
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ers, and that metropolitan competencies be expressly based on delegation
by treaty or some other instrument.2 45
International protectorates, on the other hand, were territories whose
governments had agreed to protection and retained a separate status but
nonetheless lacked a qualification of statehood such as independence. 246
This status was created by formal agreement between the parties. Even
where independent States were the subject of an international protector-
ate that substantially restricted their independence, they were often
regarded as States for some purposes.2 47
In some respects a modern trust would resemble a protected State
more than an international protectorate. If the State assuming trusteeship
245. Id. at 189. If these elements were absent, an entity generally would not be con-
sidered a protected State, but it could possess a lesser degree of personality. Id. at 194.
However, some States, such as Monaco, were recognized as protected States even where
these elements were not present.
246. Id. at 194. Crawford cites the controversial case of Morocco, which was gener-
ally recognized as a State, but was subject to an elaborate system of capitulations and
spheres of influence. Under the Treaty of Fez, a major part of Morocco became a
French protectorate. French rights in Morocco included stationing military forces in
the territory at French discretion; maintaining order and the security of commercial
transactions; directing that necessary legislative reforms be carried out by the Sultan;
and appointing a French resident to be in charge of all matters concerning foreigners.
Decrees of the Sultan, granting concessions, and making public or private loans
required French consent. By 1925, the French Zone (a smaller coastal area had been
recognized as being under a Spanish zone of influence) practically had been brought
under direct French control; only the judicial system remained formally distinct. Id. at
195. In the Case Concerning U.S. Nationals in Morocco, the International Court of
Justice held that in these circumstances Morocco retained considerable international
personality. The Court found:
It is not disputed by the French Government that Morocco, even under the
Protectorate, has retained its personality as a State in international law. The
rights of France in Morocco are defined by the Protectorate Treaty of 1912...
Under this Treaty, Morocco remained a sovereign State, but it made an
arrangement of a contractual character whereby France undertook to exercise
certain sovereign powers in the name and on behalf of Morocco, and, in princi-
ple, all the international relations of Morocco.
Case Concerning the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco
(France v. U.S.), 1952 I.CJ. 176, 185, 188 (Aug. 27).
Yet, it is problematic to define Morocco as a protected State at this point. Crawford
notes the widespread prior recognition of the Sultan, the complexity and international-
ized nature of the arrangements in Morocco, and the insistence by France on the con-
tinued statehood of Morocco as factors which mitigated in favor of national
independence. Id. at 196.
247. These protectorates formed a separate class of territorial entities with a certain
distinct legal personality. They were similar for many purposes to protected States.
[T] hey continue the personality of the State before protectorate so that its trea-
ties remain in force. Their international relations, the exercise of which is nor-
mally vested in the protecting State, remain formally distinct. Their rulers are
normally accorded sovereign immunity, at least in the protecting State's courts.
They retain their own nationality, for municipal purposes at least, if not inter-
nationally. Their relations with the protecting State are 'contractual' in nature
and continue to be governed by international law. Their status is terminated in
substantially the same way as that adopted for Protected States.
Id. at 196-97. "The protectorate relation is not in general aimed at annexation but at
secure separate government." Id.
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status entered into the agreement establishing the trust, this would differ
from trusteeship under the Charter where the territory, as a NSGT, had
neither international personality nor standing to enter into an interna-
tional agreement.248 Therefore, in this respect, a modem trust parallels a
protected State, which by agreement relinquishes part of its sovereignty
and whose relationship with the protecting State is contractual. Moreover,
as was the case with international protectorates, a modem trust does not
envision annexation, and a separate international personality is desirable.
Furthermore, in a modem trust, sovereignty is surrendered to an
international organization. This is different from the case of international
protectorates where crucial aspects of sovereignty were ceded to another
State. As the surrendering entity cannot assume the attributes of the U.N.,
this entity should be deemed a State for such purposes as nationality and
sovereign immunity. Presumably, the U.N. would not assume treaty and
other international obligations of the trust territory.
On the other hand, a State assuming trust status would be relinquish-
ing most of its independence and entering into a status that is even more
dependent than an international protectorate. While it does not yield sov-
ereignty to another State, it surrenders itself to an organization of States.
The almost total lack of independence makes it closer to a colony, which
had no international status, or at the very least a trust, where sovereignty
was, at best, in abeyance.
Consequently, it may be difficult for a modern trust territory to retain
its status as a State. Of course, this conclusion does not totally preclude
attributing some form of international personality to such an entity, espe-
cially since some form of international personality is increasingly being
accorded to entities other than States. 249 Moreover, it would not preclude
treatment of a modem trust territory as a State for some purposes.
Conclusion
There are formidable legal obstacles to applying the trusteeship system to
sovereign States. The first hurdie is Article 78, which precludes applica-
tion of the system to Member States of the United Nations because the
relationship between these States is based on respect for the principle of
sovereign equality. Thus, Article 78 would have to be amended, or the
Organization would have to determine that a State is no longer a Member
of the United Nations, and perhaps no longer a sovereign member of the
community of nations, to apply the system to sovereign States.
While sovereignty is receding in many respects, trusteeship as envi-
sioned in the Charter is incompatible with this concept, however narrowly
it may be defined. Trusteeship entails ceding major attributes of sover-
eignty to an organization of States and may mean a loss of statehood itself.
This author believes it is doubtful many governments would be willing to
248. The trust agreement was between the administering power and the U.N. U.N.
Ci-AR"R art. 77.
249. BROWNLIE, supra note 19, at 60-69.
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take such a drastic step. Moreover, even if a government were so inclined,
the principle of self-determination may render a decision to submit to
trusteeship illegal, unless it emanates directly from the people. However,
much self-determination may be in transition with respect to current inter-
national problems of secession, minority rights, and nationalism, as it is
resolved with respect to colonialism. In this arena, it has evolved to mean
independence, unless a different status is freely and directly chosen by the
people. Thus, unless a people directly and freely choose trusteeship, this
principle may preclude imposing trusteeship.
The possible scenarios whereby trusteeship would be established also
suggest complications. Given Articles 77 and 78 of the Charter, it is
unclear whether the United Nations can employ trusteeship even with the
express consent of the target state, because the organization would be act-
ing in contravention of the Charter. This would also apply to the Security
Council imposing trusteeship in response to a threat to the peace or as a
means of addressing a humanitarian crisis as a threat to the peace. While
the Security Council has very broad powers to address these threats, it
must do so in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United
Nations Charter, and it is doubtful whether it can undertake endeavors
that are in direct contravention of a specific article of the Charter.
Disintegrating States present a difficult problem which the interna-
tional community must solve, so as to avoid the potential human catastro-
phe that may otherwise be wrought. However, trusteeship is not the
answer, at least in its present form. Putting aside other conceivable objec-
tions,250 the legal obstacles are onerous. While it is always possible that
the Charter could be amended to address the legal difficulties, and some
consensus could be reached that would deal with the other legal hurdles,
this writer believes this result is improbable. Moreover, perhaps it should
be.
Trusteeship would bequeath the international community non-self-
governing peoples, a status we have been attempting to eradicate over the
past fifty years. Admittedly these entities would be under the tutelage of
an international organization rather than individual States, and perhaps,
like the original trusteeship system, this is a step beyond unadulterated
colonialism. Yet trusteeship has always been, and would remain, a form of
colonialism.
Colonialism and trusteeship were based on the assumption that cer-
tain peoples were to be governed by others because they were incapable of
governing themselves. The international community is moving slowly, but
inexorably, towards the principle that all peoples are capable of governing
themselves. This ideal should hold true, in all of its myriad manifestations,
for all human beings. Rather than focusing on various forms of depen-
dency, we should explore creative mechanisms to assist, rather than direct,
peoples in determining and realizing their ambition to determine and
250. Besides the moral and political objections to dependency, the costs and
resources entailed in trusteeship may also be of concern.
Vol 28
1995 Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship 347
control their own destiny. The means, as well as the ends, should be inde-
pendence rather than dependency.

